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Which Random Matching Markets Exhibit a Stark Effect of
Competition?
Yash Kanoria∗ Seungki Min† Pengyu Qian‡.
Abstract
We revisit the popular random matching market model introduced by Knuth (1976) and
Pittel (1989), and shown by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2013) to exhibit a “stark effect
of competition”, i.e., with any difference in the number of agents on the two sides, the short
side agents obtain substantially better outcomes. We generalize the model to allow “partially
connected” markets with each agent having an average degree d in a random (undirected)
graph. Each agent has a (uniformly random) preference ranking over only their neighbors in the
graph. We characterize stable matchings in large markets and find that the short side enjoys a
significant advantage only for d exceeding log2 n where n is the number of agents on one side:
For moderately connected markets with d = o(log2 n), we find that there is no stark effect of
competition, with agents on both sides getting a
√
d-ranked partner on average. Notably, this
regime extends far beyond the connectivity threshold of d = Θ(log n). In contrast, for densely
connected markets with d = ω(log2 n), we find that the short side agents get log n-ranked
partner on average, while the long side agents get a partner of (much larger) rank d/ log n on
average. Numerical simulations of our model confirm and sharpen our theoretical predictions.
Since preference list lengths in most real-world matching markets are much below log2 n, our
findings may help explain why available datasets do not exhibit a strong effect of competition.
Keywords: random matching markets, incomplete preference lists, stable matching, competition.
1 Introduction
Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (Ashlagi et al. 2017) found that in a matching market with n men
and n + 1 women, and uniformly randomly complete preference lists, independent across agents,
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there is a nearly unique stable matching, where the average rank of men for their wives is just
log n(1 + o(1)) (the same as it would have been under random serial dictatorship, where each
man in turn selects their favorite remaining woman), whereas the average rank of women for their
husbands is nlogn(1 + o(1)). For example, with n = 1, 000, men get matched to their seventh most
desired woman, whereas women are matched to only their 145th most preferred man. Of course the
situation is completely reversed if, instead, there are 999 women, while the number of men is still
1, 000. This led Ashlagi et al. (2017) to conclude “... we find that matching markets are extremely
competitive, with even the slightest imbalance greatly benefiting the short side.”
Meanwhile, over the past two decades, a large number of real world matching market datasets
from deferred acceptance (DA) based clearinghouses have become available to different researchers
in the field, e.g., from centralized labor markets like the National Residency Matching Program
(NRMP) (Roth and Peranson 1999) and the Israel Psychology Masters Match (Hassidim et al.
2017b), college admissions (e.g., Rios et al. 2019), and school choice (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al.
2005). Since these (and other) clearinghouses run the incentive-compatible deferred acceptance
(DA) algorithm, the preference rankings collected may be assumed to reflect the true underlying
preferences.1 Notably, none of these real world data sets exhibit a “stark effect of competition”
phenomenon, i.e., we do not see an abrupt change in the stable matching for a small change in
market composition. As a representative example, we provide numerical counterfactuals for high
school admissions data collected in one of the major cities in the U.S.: The data includes the
preference lists provided by nearly 75,000 applicants, and 700 programs with a total capacity of
73,000. To study the effect of competition, we vary the market “imbalance” across a wide range
by dropping up to 20,000 students from the data (uniformly at random) at one extreme, and
duplicating up to 20,000 students (uniformly at random) at the other extreme, while holding the
set of programs and their capacities fixed. We numerically evaluate the effect of thus varying the
number of students on the resulting allocation of programs to students under the student-proposing
DA algorithm. As per the usual practice, we summarize the allocation in terms of the fraction of
students who are allotted to one of their top-k most preferred programs (for k = 1, 3) and the
fraction who are unassigned; see the solid lines in Figure 1. Observe that the summary statistics
1Incentive compatibility of DA for the proposing side was established by Dubins and Freedman (1981). For the
receiving side, approximate IC is strongly suggested by the findings of Kojima and Pathak (2009) and Ashlagi et al.
(2017), among others, and the mechanism further seems very hard to manipulate in most practical settings. However,
it is worth noting Hassidim et al. (2017a) has found empirical evidence of incorrect preference reporting in certain
situations, while Echenique et al. (2020) suggests that participants may not report options they like if those options
are infeasible. Since the extent and nature of misreporting in our data (if any) is unclear, we simply assume the
preference reports to be truthful.
2
vary extremely smoothly and slowly in the number of students over a wide range. In other words, we
observe no stark effect of competition in real world data, which is at odds with the aforementioned
conclusion of Ashlagi et al. (2017).
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Figure 1: Fraction of students who are assigned to one of their top-k most preferred programs
(for k = 1, 3) and the fraction of students who are unassigned, as a function of the number of
students removed or duplicated uniformly at random. Simulations are based on the actual high
school admissions data containing 75k applicants and 73k seats across 700 programs (averaged
across 100 realizations). The solid lines use the student preference rankings and program priorities
in the original data, and implement a single tie-breaking rule3. The dotted lines are based on
randomizing preferences and priorities: Each student’s preference list has unchanged length but
its entries are drawn without replacement with the sampling probability of each program being
proportional to the number of students who have applied to it in the original dataset, and each
program uses a uniformly random and independent priority ordering over students.
The stochastic model of matching markets considered in Ashlagi et al. (2017) is often called a
“random matching market”; one where agents have independent, complete and uniformly random
preference lists over the other side. The model was introduced by Knuth (Knuth 1976), heavily
studied by Pittel and others (Pittel 1989, Knuth et al. 1990, Pittel 1992) and this model (and
variants) remains a workhorse for research in the area (e.g., Lee 2016, Menzel 2015) and even for
deriving operational insights, e.g., which tie-breaking rule to use (Ashlagi and Nikzad 2016), making
it imperative that we understand how its predictions might depart from reality, and the role played
by each of the stylized assumptions in the model.
It is natural to ask whether correlation in preferences in real markets is the reason that they do
3Under single tie-breaking, each student receives a random lottery number at the beginning of matching process,
which is used by all programs for breaking ties between applicants with the same priority.
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not exhibit a strong effect of competition. Indeed, if preferences on the “men” side of the market
are fully correlated (i.e., all agents have the same preference ordering) while the other “women” side
has arbitrary preferences, then there is a unique stable matching which can be computed by running
serial dictatorship by women (women serially pick their favorite available man), in the order of the
womens’ universal ranking by men. One would expect this unique stable matching to transform
smoothly as the number of agents on one side of the market is varied. To test whether correlation is
indeed the reason we see only a weak effect of competition in the actual high school admissions data
introduced above, we ran an additional experiment with “randomized” preferences: We took only
the student and program “degrees” (i.e., preference list lengths and number of times the program is
listed) from the data, generated both student preference lists and program priorities independently
at random, and studied the resulting allocation as a function of the number of students; see the
dotted lines in Figure 1 (the distribution over preferences is precisely specified in the caption of
the figure). While the effect of competition under randomized preferences is somewhat stronger
than in the original data,4 it bears no resemblance to the abrupt phase transition found by Ashlagi
et al. (2017). Thus it appears that even without correlation in preferences, and despite being very
well connected,5 realistic markets seem to lack a strong effect of competition. This prompts us
to investigate the effect of the level of connectivity in the random matching market model on the
effect of competition.
Model. Our model generalizes the random matching market model to allow “partially connected”
markets with each agent having an average degree d in a random (undirected) connectivity graph.
Each agent has a preference ranking over only their neighbors in the connectivity graph. We assume
there are n + k men and n women, where the “imbalance” k may be positive or negative but we
restrict to “small” imbalances |k| = o(n). For technical convenience, the random graph model we
work with is one where each man is connected to a uniformly random subset of exactly d women,
independent of other men.6
4Define the elasticity of the fraction of students who get their top choice as the percent change in this fraction for
every 1% change in the number of students. Near the status quo number of students, we find that the elasticity of
the high school market is nearly -1.0, whereas the elasticity of the randomized high school market is nearly -2.8.
5In the high school admissions setting, both without and with randomization of preferences, over 97% of student
pairs are within two hops of each other and nearly 100% are within three hops of each other (a pair of students is
within one hop of each other if they list a program in common).
6As a result, each woman has Binomial(n+ k, d/n)
d−−−−→
n→∞
Poisson(d) neighbors where
d−→ denotes convergence in
distribution. Throughout the paper we will restrict attention to d = ω(1), as a result of which Poisson(d)
p−→ d, i.e.,
the degree of each woman is also very close to d, and so the asymmetry between the two sides in the model is mainly
technical.
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Main findings. We characterize stable matchings as a function of d and the number of women
n and find that the short side enjoys a significant advantage only for d exceeding log2 n: For
moderately connected markets, specifically any d such that d = o(log2 n) and d = ω(1) and large n,
we find that there is no stark effect of competition, namely, the short and long sides of the market
are almost equally well off (for |k| = O(n1−) market imbalance), with agents on both sides getting
a
√
d(1+o(1))-ranked partner on average. Notably, this regime extends far beyond the connectivity
threshold (above which the connectivity graph is connected with high probability) of d = Θ(log n).
On the other hand, for densely connected markets, specifically for any d = ω(log2 n) and large n,
we find that there is a stark effect of competition: assuming a small imbalance |k| = o(n), the
short side agents get a partner of rank log n on average, while the long side agents get a partner of
(much larger) rank d/ log n on average. Numerical simulations of our model confirm the theoretical
predictions, and in fact further enhance our understanding: they suggest a sharp threshold between
the two regimes close to d ≈ 1.0 × log2 n and that this holds even for small n down to n & 10.
Figure 2 provides a schematic depicting our main findings (including the d ≈ 1.0× log2 n threshold
between regimes suggested by numerics).
Since preference list lengths in most real markets are much below log2 n (the latter is nearly 48
for n = 1000 and nearly 117 for n = 50000), and correlation in preferences only appears to reduce
the effect of competition (see Figure 1 for indicative evidence), our findings may explain why real
world matching datasets do not exhibit a strong effect of competition.
We highlight that the “no stark effect” regime includes well connected markets for connectivity
in the range d ∈ (Θ(log n), o(log2 n)). This is in sharp contrast to buyer-seller market, where,
roughly, connectivity implies a stark effect of competition where the short side of the market
captures all the surplus (see Remark 1 in Section 3 for a detailed discussion). In particular, our
results imply that the informal claim in Ashlagi et al. (2017) of strong similarity between the two
kinds of markets is incorrect for moderately connected markets (parallel to the fact that most real
world matching markets are well connected but do not exhibit a stark effect of competition).
Intuition for our findings. We now provide the high level intuition behind our main results.
Ashlagi et al. (2017) showed a stark effect of competition for fully connected markets d = n. We
find that as d is decreased, this phenomenon remains intact if all short side agents are matched:
if women are on the long side (k < 0), though the average rank of women for their husbands
RWOMEN ≈ d/ log n decreases as d decreases, it remains true that men are significantly better off
than women RWOMEN/RMEN ≥ 1 + Ω(1). As d falls below a certain threshold, a positive number of
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Figure 2: Schematic showing the two “competitiveness” regimes for partially connected random
matching markets with small imbalance, n women, men being on the short side, and connectivity
(average preference list length) d. RMEN denotes the average rank of men for their wives, and
RWOMEN the average rank of women for their husbands.
men remains unmatched with high probability. The threshold turns out to be log2 n, corresponding
to the fact that the maximum number of proposals made by any man in the fully connected random
market is Θ(log2 n); see Pittel (2019a).
But does a few agents remaining unmatched have any bearing on the stark effect of competition
phenomenon? A priori it is unclear that this should be the case. After all, it is easy to construct
matching markets such that some short side agents remain unmatched, but where the short side
is nevertheless significantly better off than the long side.7 Remarkably, we find that in random
matching markets there is no stark effect of competition if some short side agents remain unmatched.
We now provide some informal intuition why random matching markets have this property: Clearly,
due to the matching constraint the number of unmatched men must be exactly k plus the number
of unmatched women. Hence, assuming a small imbalance k (the balanced market with k = 0
being a special case), the number of unmatched agents on the two sides must be nearly the same.
But the number of unmatched men should grow with RMEN (the more proposals men need to make
in men-proposing DA, the larger the number of men that will reach the end of their preference
list), whereas the number of unmatched women should similarly grow with RWOMEN (e.g., one can
7For instance, consider a densely connected random matching market with the modification that a few agents on
the short side have empty (or short) preference lists. The latter agents will remain unmatched, but the short side
agents will nevertheless have a much smaller average rank for the their partners than the long side agents.
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consider women-proposing DA, and assume — or prove separately — that, as usual, the WOSM is
close to the MOSM). We deduce that we should have RMEN ≈ RWOMEN in the d  log2 n regime,
i.e., there is almost no advantage from being on the short side of the market.
Next, we provide more detailed quantitative intuition leading informally to the sharp estimates
of RMEN and RWOMEN in our characterization of moderately connected markets. This intuition is
based on a detailed heuristic picture of the stable outcome in a random matching market (we do
not formalize the full detailed picture in this paper, and instead prove our main theorem via a
“shortcut” described below). Intuitively, both RMEN and the number of unmatched men δ
m should
be governed by the (endogenous) probability pMEN that a neighboring woman j (independently of
other women) is “interested” in given man i (the woman j is said to be interested if she receives no
proposal which she prefers to i): in particular, the rank of man i for his wife (his most preferred
woman who accepts his proposal) should be distributed as Geometric(pMEN) truncated at d, leading
to RMEN ≈ 1/pMEN (assuming 1/pMEN  d) and δm ≈ nP(Geometric(pMEN) > d) = n(1−pMEN)−d ≈
n exp(−dpMEN). Analogously for women, letting pWOMEN denote the (endogeneous) probability that
woman j receives a proposal from each neighboring man i, we expect RWOMEN ≈ 1/pWOMEN and
δw ≈ n exp(−dpWOMEN). For k small, we have that both sides must have nearly the same number of
unmatched agents δw ≈ δm and hence pWOMEN ≈ pMEN and RMEN ≈ RWOMEN. But we can further get
quantitative estimates: the average number of proposals received by women is nearly the same as the
average number of proposals made by men (n+ k)RMEN/n ≈ RMEN ≈ 1/pMEN, and since pWOMEN ≈
average number of proposals received/(typical length of preference list) ≈ 1/(dpMEN). We deduce
that pMEN ≈ pWOMEN ≈ 1√d and so RMEN ≈ RWOMEN ≈
√
d and δm ≈ δw ≈ ne−
√
d.
Technical contributions. Our characterization of the stable matching in partially connected
random matching markets (as a function of connectivity d) is novel: stable matchings have not
been previously characterized either in balanced or in unbalanced random markets under partial
connectivity d < n and d = ω(1). (A few papers have studied the extreme case of sparsely connected
markets d = Θ(1) under various preference models; see Section 1.1.)
Our characterization showing a stark effect of competition in densely connected markets d =
ω(log2 n) is proved via an analysis similar to Ashlagi et al. (2017). In contrast, our characterization
showing no stark effect of competition in moderately connected markets d = o(log2 n) and d = ω(1)
overcomes significant technical difficulties via a novel approach as we now describe.
The main challenge we face relative to previous works studying fully connected markets (e.g.,
Ashlagi et al. 2017, Knuth 1976) is the complexity in the way that DA terminates when there is a
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positive (but vanishing) fraction of unmatched agents on both sides of the market. Note that DA
terminates when the number of women who have received at least one proposal equals the number
of men who have not exhausted their lists. In the large d regime (including fully connected markets
as studied in the prior literature), it is likely, assuming that men are on the short side (k < 0),
that the event of n + k distinct women each receiving at least one proposal happens before any
man reaches the bottom of his list. As a result, the total number of proposals in DA can be well
approximated by the solution of the coupon collector’s problem where n+ k distinct coupons must
be drawn, and key properties of the MOSM can be deduced from there. In the small to medium d
regime, however, it is likely that a positive number of men have reached the end of their lists during
the run of DA. As a result, to estimate the number of proposals of DA, it is necessary to get a handle
on the number of men who have been rejected d times, which is considerably more complicated to
analyze, especially for d = ω(1) as we consider, where the fraction of unmatched men is positive but
vanishing (previous works, especially Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), have developed a machinery
to handle the case of d = Θ(1) which leads to a Θ(1) fraction of unmatched agents). One of our
technical contributions is resolving this difficulty. Instead of proving the detailed heuristic picture
given in the previous paragraph, we control two main quantities: (i) the total number of proposals
before DA terminates (this quantity is the one tracked in the related literature), and (ii) the number
of unmatched men and women when DA terminates. The matching constraint tells us that the
number of unmatched men is exactly k plus the number of unmatched women. Thus, to control
(ii) it suffices to control the number of unmatched men. We estimate (bound) this quantity by
constructing a “fake” process where a man who is accepted and then later rejected is allowed to
make d additional proposals. It turns out this process is much easier to analyze and it yields a
sufficiently good estimate of the number of men who end up unmatched under the assumption
d = o(log2 n).
1.1 Related work
The closest papers to our work are the ones studying random matching markets Knuth (1976), Pittel
(1989), Knuth et al. (1990), Pittel (1992), Ashlagi et al. (2017), Pittel (2019a). All of these papers
assume complete preference lists. Whereas the early papers focused on balanced random markets
and found that the proposing side (in DA) has a substantial advantage, Ashlagi et al. (2017) and
follow up papers found that in unbalanced markets, the short side has a substantial advantage. The
main technical difficulty we face relative to these papers is that a positive number of agents remain
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unmatched on both sides of the market in moderately connected markets d = o(log2 n), preventing
us from directly leveraging the analogy with the coupon collector problem as in the previous works.
Notable papers by Immorlica and Mahdian and others (Immorlica and Mahdian 2005, Kojima
and Pathak 2009) show a small core (i.e., a small set of stable matchings) while working with short
(constant-sized) preference lists, leading to a linear fraction of unmatched agents. Arnosti (Arnosti
2015) and Menzel (Menzel 2015) characterize the (nearly unique) stable outcome in settings with
constant-sized preference lists, and in particular, we expect their characterizations can be used to
show that the outcome changes “smoothly” as a function of the market imbalance under short
lists. In contrast to the aforementioned papers, our work restricts attention to the case d = ω(1)
and indeed identifies the existence of a threshold at d ∼ log2 n, as a result of which the fraction of
unmatched agents in our setting is vanishing. Technically, the consequence of this phenomenon is
that “rejection chains” in the progress of DA are ω(1) in length in our work, making them harder
to analyze, and the (approximate) system “state” no longer has bounded dimension as in Arnosti
(2015).
Our work belongs to a vast theoretical literature on matching markets, which began with the
work of Gale and Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962) introducing stable matching and the deferred
acceptance algorithm, and has developed over the last six decades with major contributions by Roth,
Sotomayor, and a large number of other prominent researchers (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor 1990,
David 2013). Key combinatorial properties of stable matchings are extremely well understood for
multiple decades now, and more recently, it has been generally accepted that in typical matching
markets, the man optimal stable matching is nearly the same as the woman optimal stable matching
Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Ashlagi et al. (2017), allowing one to
talk about the stable matching in typical settings.
What still remains troublingly mysterious is the nature of the stable matching as a function of
market primitives, especially in settings where there is a significant idiosyncratic/horizontal com-
ponent to preferences and preference lists are not short (when there is a strong vertical component
to preferences, the outcome is known to be approximately assortative, e.g., see Legros and Newman
(2007)). Ashlagi et al. (2017) suggested that the outcome depends heavily on which side is the short
side of the market, but innumerable datasets and the present theoretical work indicate that this is
not the case in typical markets. The present paper aims to explain the relative lack of competitive-
ness of typical matching markets, and overall to take a small step towards a better understanding
of how the stable matching depends on market primitives. Reasoning based on Ashlagi et al. (2017)
has the potential to lead theorists (and perhaps practitioners) astray, given that we often want to
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derive operational insights, e.g., which tie breaking rule to use Ashlagi and Nikzad (2016), based
on the analysis of models resembling the random matching market model.
There is a robust and growing body of practical work on designing real world matching markets,
especially in the contexts of school and college admissions (e.g., Rios et al. 2019, Abdulkadiroglu
et al. 2005, Dur et al. 2018), and various labor markets (e.g., Roth and Peranson 1999, Hassidim
et al. 2017b). Stability, namely, that no pair of agents should prefer to match with each other,
has been found to be crucial in the design of centralized clearinghouses (Roth 1991) and predictive
of outcomes in decentralized matching markets (Kagel and Roth 2000, Hitsch et al. 2010). We
are not aware of any real world matching dataset in which the short side of the market is vastly
better off even if the imbalance is small. It further appears that most practitioners are aware that
a platform operator cannot make one side of the market vastly better off by slightly tilting the
market imbalance in favor of that side.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce our model of partially connected random
matching markets. In Section 3, we state our main theorems (Theorem 1 and 2) and discuss them.
An overview of our proof of our characterization of moderately connected markets (Theorem 1) is
provided in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide the simulation results that confirm and sharpen
our theoretical predictions. Formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a two-sided market that consists of a set of men M = {1, . . . , n + k} and a set of
women W = {1, . . . , n}. Here k is a positive or negative integer, which we call the imbalance.
We fix a positive integer d ≤ n which we call the connectivity (or average degree) of the market.
Each man i has a strict preference list i over a uniformly random subset Wi ⊂ W of |Wi| = d
women (from among the
(
n
d
)
possibilities), where the subsets Wi are drawn independently across
men. Each woman j has strict preferences j over only the men who include her in their preference
list8
Mj = {i ∈M : j ∈ Wi} .
A matching is a mapping µ from M∪W to itself such that for every i ∈ M, µ(i) ∈ W ∪ {i}, and
8Equivalently, we sample an undirected bipartite random graph G connecting men M to women W, where each
man has degree exactly d and the d neighboring women of each man are selected uniformly at random and indepen-
dently across men. Given G, for each agent has a strict preference ranking over all his/her neighbors in G and does
not rank any other agents.
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for every j ∈ W, µ(j) ∈ M∪ {j}, and for every i, j ∈ M∪W, µ(i) = j implies µ(j) = i. We use
µ(j) = j to denote that agent j is unmatched under µ.
A matching µ is unstable if there are a man i and a woman j such that j i µ(i) and i j µ(j).
A matching is stable if it is not unstable.
A random matching market is generated by drawing, for each man i, a uniformly random
preference list over Wi (from among the |Wi|! possibilities), and for each woman j, a uniformly
random preference list over Mj , independently across agents.
A stable matching always exists, and can be found using the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algo-
rithm by Gale and Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962). They show that the men-proposing DA finds
the men-optimal stable matching (MOSM), in which every man is matched with his most preferred
stable woman. The MOSM matches every woman with her least preferred stable man. Likewise,
the women-proposing DA produces the women-optimal stable matching (WOSM) with symmetric
properties. All of our results will characterize the MOSM. Given the strong evidence from Immor-
lica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Ashlagi et al. (2017) and other works that
the MOSM and WOSM are nearly the same in typical matching markets (with the exception of
balanced and densely connected random markets, which we avoid by assuming k < 0 in Theorem 2),
we omit to formally show this fact for our setting in the current version of the paper though we
believe it can be done, e.g., using the method developed in Cai and Thomas (2019) (the property
MOSM ≈WOSM is found to hold consistently in our numerical simulations of our model).
We are interested in how matched agents rank their assigned partners under stable matching,
and in the number of agents who remain unmatched. Denote the rank of woman j in the preference
list i of man i by Ranki(j) ≡ |{j′ : j′ i j}|. A smaller rank is better, and i’s most preferred
woman has a rank of 1. Symmetrically, denote the rank of i in the preference list of j by Rankj(i).
Definition 1. Given a matching µ, the men’s average rank of wives is given by
RMEN(µ) =
1
n+ k
|M¯(µ)|(d+ 1) + ∑
i∈M\M¯(µ)
Ranki(µ(i))
 ,
where M¯(µ) is the set of men who are unmatched under µ, and the number of unmatched men is
denoted by δm(µ), i.e., δm(µ) = |M¯(µ)|.
Similarly, the women’s average rank of husbands is given by
RWOMEN(µ) =
1
n
 ∑
j∈W¯(µ)
(|Mj |+ 1) +
∑
j∈W\W¯(µ)
Rankj(µ(j))

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where W¯(µ) is the set of women who are unmatched under µ, and the number of unmatched women
is denoted by δw(µ), i.e., δw(µ) = |W¯(µ)|.
(Note here that if an agent is unmatched, we take the rank for the agent to be one more than
the length of the agent’s preference list.) By the rural hospital theorem Roth (1986), the set of
unmatched agents (M¯(µ) and W¯(µ)) is the same in every stable matching µ, and therefore we
simply represent the number of unmatched men and women under stable matching by δm and δw
respectively throughout the remainder of paper.
We remark that the only asymmetry in our model is that the lengths of men’s preference lists
are deterministically d, whereas each woman has Binomial(n+ k, d/n)
d−−−→
n→∞ Poisson(d) neighbors
where
d−→ denotes convergence in distribution. Since our theoretical analysis will assume d = ω(1),
we have Poisson(d)
p−→ d, i.e., the degree of each woman is also very close to d, and so the asymmetry
between the two sides in the model is mainly technical.
3 Results
In this section we state and discuss our main results.
Before stating our results, we restate a main finding of Ashlagi et al. (2017) (Theorem 2 in that
paper) on the structure of stable matchings in fully connected random markets. (The statement has
been modified —and slightly weakened in the process— with the aim of allowing easy comparison
with our main theorems.)
Theorem (Ashlagi et al. (2017), Fully connected markets). Consider a sequence of random match-
ing markets indexed by n, with n+ k men and n women, for k = k(n) ∈ [−n/2,−1], and complete
preference lists on both sides of the market (i.e., connectivity d = n). For fixed  > 0, with high
probability the following hold for every stable matching9 µ:
RMEN(µ) ≤ (1 + ε)
(
n
n+k
)
log
(
n
|k|
)
,
RWOMEN(µ) ≥ n+ k
1 + (1 + ε)
(
n
n+k
)
log
(
n
|k|
) ,
and all men are matched.
The theorem shows that even a slight imbalance in the number of agents on the two sides of the
market results in a stark effect on stable outcomes that strongly favors the agents on the short side
9Though our definition of average rank is slightly different from that of Ashlagi et al. (2017), the bounds stated
are nevertheless valid for our definition.
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of the market: agents on the short side are essentially able to freely choose their partners (as Ashlagi
et al. (2017) explain, RMEN is nearly the same as it would be under random serial dictatorship by
the men), whereas agents on the long side do only a little better than being matched with a random
partner. In particular, even with k = −1, it holds that RMEN(µ) ≤ 1.01 log n and RWOMEN(µ) ≥ 0.99nlogn
in every stable matching, w.h.p. In the present paper, we investigate stable matchings in random
partially connected matching markets, and compare with the above finding of Ashlagi et al. (2017).
Moderately and sparsely connected markets. In our first main result, we show that the
short-side advantage disappears in partially connected markets (with small or zero imbalance)
whose connectivity parameter d is below log2 n.
Theorem 1 (Moderately Connected Markets). Consider a sequence of random matching markets
indexed by n, with n + k men and n women (k = k(n) can be positive or negative or zero), and
connectivity (average degree) d = d(n), with d = ω(1) and d = o(log2 n), and10 |k| = O(ne−
√
d).
Then with high probability,11 we have∣∣∣RMEN(MOSM)−√d∣∣∣ ≤ d0.3 ,∣∣∣RWOMEN(MOSM)−√d∣∣∣ ≤ d0.3 ,∣∣∣log δm − log (ne−√d)∣∣∣ ≤ d0.3 ,∣∣∣log δw − log (ne−√d)∣∣∣ ≤ d0.3 .
Informally, in large random matching markets with average degree d = o(log2 n) and a small
imbalance k = O(n1−), under stable matching we have RMEN ≈ RWOMEN ≈
√
d irrespective of
which side is the short side, and there are approximately ne−
√
d = ω(1) unmatched agents on both
sides of the market. Thus there is no short-side advantage and agents on both sides are matched
to their
√
d-th ranked partner on average. A significant number of agents are left unmatched even
on the short side, in contrast to a fully connected unbalanced matching market where all agents on
the short side are matched. Though we only characterize the MOSM in the present version of the
paper, we believe the same characterization extends to the WOSM as well. We give an overview of
the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 4 and the formal proof in Appendix B.
The main intuition for Theorem 1 is that for d = o(log2 n), a positive number of men remain
unmatched with high probability, because they reach the end of their preference lists in men-
proposing DA (Pittel (2019a) showed that some men need to go log2 n deep in their preference lists
10In particular, for arbitrary fixed  > 0, the result holds for any k = k(n) that satisfies |k(n)| = O(n1−).
11Specifically, our characterization holds with probability at least 1−O(exp(−d1/4)) = 1− o(1).
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in the fully connected market). Clearly, the number of unmatched men must be exactly k plus
the number of unmatched women. Then, assuming a small imbalance k, the number of unmatched
agents on the two sides must be nearly the same. But the number of unmatched men should
grow with RMEN (the more men need to propose, the larger the number that will reach the end
of their preference lists), whereas the number of unmatched women should similarly grow with
RWOMEN (e.g., one can consider women proposing DA, and assume that, as usual, the WOSM is
close to the MOSM). We deduce that we should have RMEN ≈ RWOMEN in the d  log2 n regime.
(Informal quantitative intuition leading to the precise estimates of RMEN and δ
m is provided in the
introduction; we avoid reproducing it here.)
We highlight that Theorem 1 encompasses a wide range of connectivity parameters d = o(log2 n),
which extends far beyond the connectivity threshold d ≈ log n (this is the connectivity threshold in
our model, the same as for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs). Thus our “no stark effect of competition”
result does not require a disconnected or fragmented market. Rather, the result applies even to
very well connected markets.12 This is in sharp contrast to buyer-seller markets, where, roughly,
connectivity implies a stark effect of competition, as captured in the following remark.
Remark 1 (Connected buyer-seller markets exhibit a stark effect of competition). Consider a
buyer-seller market where each of n+k sellers is selling one unit of the same commodity, and each
of n buyers wants to buy one unit and has value 1 for a unit. A bipartite graph G with sellers
on one side and buyers on the other captures which trades are feasible. (This is a special case
of the Shapley-Shubik assignment model (Shapley and Shubik 1971).) We say that an unbalanced
market with k > 0 (or k < 0) exhibits a stark effect of competition if, in any equilibrium, all trades
occur at price 0 (or 1), i.e., the agents on the short side, namely buyers (sellers), capture all the
surplus. Then we know (Shapley and Shubik 1971) that for k 6= 0 the market exhibits a stark effect
of competition if the following requirement is satisfied:
E ≡ {For each agent j on the long side, there exists a matching in G
where all short side agents are matched but agent j is unmatched } .
Requirement E is only slightly stronger than connectivity of G: Suppose, as in our model in Sec-
tion 2, that each seller is connected to a uniformly random subset of d buyers. Under this stochastic
model for G, for any sequence of k such that 1 ≤ |k| = O(1), event E occurs (i.e., there is a stark
12For example, with n = 1, 000, log2 n ≈ 48. Taking d = 10 (much less than 48), numerics tell us that 9.6% of
pairs of men are within 1 hop of each other (i.e., there is woman who is ranked by both men), and 99.98% of pairs
of men are within 2 hops of each other.
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effect of competition) for all d exceeding the connectivity threshold at d = log n:
(i) For any  > 0 and d ≥ (1 + ) log n, with high probability, G is connected and moreover, event
E occurs, i.e., there is a stark effect of competition.
(ii) For any  > 0 and d ≤ (1 − ) log n, with high probability, the connectivity graph G is
disconnected (in fact a positive number of buyers have degree zero).
Numerical simulations in the Section 5 show that the finding in Theorem 1 holds up extremely
well for all d . 1.0 log2 n for realistic values of n (not just asymptotically in n for d = o(log2 n)).
Now log2 n is quite large for realistic market sizes (see Figure 2 in the introduction), far in excess
of preference list lengths in many real markets: we have log2 n ≈ 48 for n = 1000, 85 for n = 10000
and 132 for n = 100000. In contrast, we have n ≈ 80, 000 for the high school admissions data
introduced in the Section 1 and preference lists have length no more than 12 (the average length
is only around 6.9), n ≈ 30, 000 for the National Residency Matching Program and preference lists
have length only about 11 on average. Thus, real preference list lengths are typically much smaller
than log2 n. Moreover, correlation in preferences should only reduce the effect of competition (e.g.,
see the evidence in Figure 1), leading us to contend that the vast majority of real matching markets
live in the “no stark effect of competition” regime covered by Theorem 1. This may explain why, in
simulation experiments on real data like the one shown in Figure 1, only a relatively weak effect of
competition is observed.
Densely connected markets. Our next main result shows that d ∼ log2 n is the threshold level
of connectivity above which the finding of Ashlagi et al. (2017) holds true, i.e., the short side is
markedly better off even in (large) markets with a small imbalance. Moreover, this benefit of being
on the short side arises in conjunction with the key property that all agents on the short side of
the market are matched (an implausible occurrence in real world markets).
Theorem 2 (Densely Connected Markets). Consider a sequence of random matching markets
indexed by n, with n + k men and n women, and connectivity (average degree) d = d(n), with
k = k(n) < 0 and |k| = o(n), d = ω(log2 n) and d = o(n). Then, with high probability, all men are
matched under stable matching, and we have
RMEN(MOSM) ≤ (1 + o(1)) log n ,
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≥ (1 + o(1)) d
log n
.
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This result shows that the short-side advantage emerges in densely connected markets even
when the imbalance is small (including for an imbalance of one, i.e., k = −1). More specifically,
when d = ω(log2 n), it predicts that the agents on the short side are matched to their log n-th
ranked partner on average whereas the agents on the long side are matched to their
(
d
logn
)
-th
ranked partner on average. Theorem 2 smoothly interpolates between the result in AKL (Ashlagi
et al. 2017) and our Theorem 1 (though the extremes d = Ω(n) and d = Θ(log2 n) are not covered
by the formal statement in present form): as connectedness d increases, a phase transition happens
at d = Θ(log2 n), and the short side advantage starts to emerge for d = ω(log2 n). The magnitude of
the advantage increases as the market becomes denser. Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we conclude
that, assuming a small imbalance, a short-side advantage exists if and only if a matching market is
connected densely enough, and the threshold level of connectivity d ∼ log2 n.
The analysis leading to Theorem 2 is similar to that leading to (Ashlagi et al. 2017, Theorem 2).
The number of proposals in men-proposing DA remains unaffected; the only change is that women
now have rank lists of approximate length d (instead of length n+k), and so, receiving about log n
proposals leads to an average rank of husband of about d/ log n. The proof is in Appendix C.
4 Overview of the proof of Theorem 1
This section provides an overview of the proof of Theorem 1, which is our characterization of
moderately connected random matching markets. Our proof uses the well-known analogy between
DA and the coupon collector problem to bound women’s average rank of their husbands, but
also encounters and tackles the challenge of tracking the (strictly positive) number of men who
have reached the bottom of their preference lists by constructing a novel bound using a tractable
stochastic process. The latter challenge did not arise in the setting of Ashlagi et al. (2017) where
all short side agents are matched under stable matching, and similarly doesn’t arise in our “densely
connected markets” setting (Theorem 2). Following Ashlagi et al. (2017) and the majority of other
theoretical papers on matching markets, we prove our characterizations for large n (and then use
numerics to demonstrate that they extend to small n; see Section 5). Alongside an overview of the
proof this section provides parenthetical pointers to the relevant formal lemmas; their statements
and proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Our analysis tracks the progress of the following McVitie-Wilson (McVitie and Wilson 1971)
(sequential proposals) version of the men-proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm that outputs
MOSM (the final outcome is known to be the MOSM, independent of the sequence in which
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proposals are made). Under this algorithm, only one man proposes at a time, and “rejection
chains” are run to completion before the next man is allowed to make his first proposal. The
algorithm takes the preference rankings of the agents as its input.
Algorithm 1 (Man-proposing Deferred Acceptance). Initialize “men who have entered” Mˆ ← φ,
unmatched women W¯ ← W, the number of proposals t← 0, the number of unmatched men δm ← 0.
1. If M\Mˆ is empty then terminate. Else, let i be the man with the smallest index in M\Mˆ.
Add i to Mˆ.
2. If man i has not reached the end of his preference list, do t ← t + 1 and man i proposes to
his most preferred woman j whom he has not yet proposed. If he is at the end of his list, do
δm ← δm + 1 go to Step 1.
3. Decision of j:
(a) If j ∈ W¯, i.e., j is currently unmatched, then she accepts i. Remove j from W¯. Go to
Step 1.
(b) If j is currently matched, she accepts the better of her current partner and i, and rejects
the other. Set i to be the rejected man and continue at Step 2.
Principle of deferred decisions. As we are interested in the behavior of Algorithm 1 on a ran-
dom matching market, we think of the deterministic algorithm on a random input as a randomized
algorithm, which is easier to analyze. The randomized, or coin flipping, version of the algorithm
does not receive preferences as input, but draws them through the process of the algorithm. This
is often called the principle of deferred decisions. The algorithm reads the next woman in the
preference of a man in step 2 and whether a woman prefers a man over her current proposal in step
3b. No man applies twice to the same woman during the algorithm, and therefore the algorithm
never reads previously revealed preferences. In step 2 the randomized algorithm selects the woman
j uniformly at random from those to whom man i has not yet proposed. In step 3b, the probabil-
ity that j prefers i over her current match is 1/(ν(j) + 1) where ν(j) is the number of proposals
previously received by woman j.
Stopping time. Algorithm 1 defines that “time” t ticks whenever a man makes a proposal. First
observe that the current number of unmatched men δm[t] = δm at time t, i.e., men who have reached
the bottom of their lists and are still unmatched, is non-decreasing over time, whereas the current
number of unmatched women δw[t] = |W¯| at time t, i.e., women who have yet to receive their first
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proposal, is non-increasing over time. The MOSM is found when the number of unmatched men
exactly equals the number of unmatched women plus k. We view this total number of proposals τ
when DA terminates as a stopping time:
τ = min{t ≥ 1 : δm[t] = δw[t] + k} . (1)
This total number of proposals τ serves as a key quantity enabling our formal characterization of
the MOSM (see Figure 3 for an illustration). On the men’s side, the sum of men’s rank of wives is
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Figure 3: Illustration of a sample path of the current number of unmatched men δm[t] and
unmatched women δw[t] under Man-proposing Deferred Acceptance (Algorithm 1). The algorithm
terminates at t = τ , the first time δm[t] = δw[t] + k. (In this illustration k > 0).
approximately the total number of proposals τ (more precisely, this sum is τ + δm[τ ] given that the
rank for an unmatched agent is defined as one more than the length of the agent’s preference list,
but τ  δm[τ ] is the dominant term). On women’s side, since each proposal goes approximately to
a uniformly random woman, as a function of the total number of proposals we can tightly control
the distribution of the number of proposals received by individual women (this distribution is close
to Poisson and tightly concentrates around its average) and therefore their average rank of husbands
(Propositions 5 and 6), as well as the number of unmatched women (Propositions 2 and13 4).
Therefore, the bulk of the proof of Theorem 1 is dedicated to bounding the total number of
proposals τ . Because of the aforementioned technical challenge that a positive number of agents
remain unmatched on both sides, a direct application of the coupon collector analogy is not enough.
Instead, we control the two stochastic processes that track the current number of unmatched
13In Proposition 4, we first upper bound the number of unmatched women, and then use the aforementioned
observation to lower bound the number of proposals.
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men δm[t] and unmatched women δw[t] at each time t and make use of the identity (1) that
δm[τ ] = δw[τ ] + k. (Upon termination, the number of unmatched men must be k plus the number
of unmatched women.) For technical purposes, we extend the definition of δm[t] and δw[t] to t > τ
as follows: if there are no men waiting to propose (i.e., a stable matching has been found), we
introduce a fake man who is connected to d women (uniformly and independently drawn) with a
uniformly random preference ranking over them, and keep running Algorithm 1.
Upper bound on the total number of proposals. We show (in Proposition 1) that the
total number of proposals cannot be too large, i.e., τ ≤ (1 + )n√d with high probability for
 = d−1/4 = o(1). We establish this bound by showing that after a large enough number of
proposals have been made, i.e., at time t = (1 + )n
√
d, the current number of unmatched women
δw[t] has (with high probability) dropped below ne−
√
d whereas the current number of unmatched
men δm[t] has (with high probability) increased above some level which is ω(ne−
√
d) and hence,
since k = O(ne−
√
d), the stopping event (δm[τ ] = δw[τ ] + k) must have happened earlier, i.e., τ ≤
(1+)n
√
d. The upper bound on δw[(1+)n
√
d] (see Lemma 7) is derived using a standard approach
that utilizes the analogy to the coupon collector problem. The lower bound on δm[(1 + )n
√
d] (see
Lemma 10) is obtained by counting the number of occurrences of d-rejections-in-a-row during the
men-proposing DA procedure (whenever rejections take place d times in a row, at least one man
becomes unmatched). Thus, our lower bound on δm[(1 + )n
√
d] ignores that some men are first
accepted, and then later rejected causing them to reach the end of their preference lists via less
than d consecutive rejections. Our conservative approach provides tractability and saves us from
needing to track how far down their preference lists the currently matched men are. Nevertheless,
the slack in this step necessitates our stronger assumption d = o(log2 n), despite our conjecture
that the characterization extends for all d < 0.99 log2 n.
Lower bound on the total number of proposals. We prove (in Proposition 4) that the total
number of proposals cannot be too small, i.e., τ ≥ (1 − )n√d with high probability for some
 = o(1). We start with upper bounding (in Lemma 13) the expected number of unmatched men
in the stable matching, E[δm], by showing that the probability of the last proposing man being
rejected cannot be too large given that each woman has received at most (1 + )
√
d proposals on
average (recall that τ ≤ (1 + )n√d w.h.p.). We then use Markov’s inequality to derive an upper
bound on δm which holds with high probability, and deduce (in Proposition 3) an upper bound on
δw using the identity δm = δw + k. Then we again use the coupon collector analogy to bound τ
from below: the process cannot stop too early since the current number of unmatched women δw[t]
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does not decay fast enough to satisfy the upper bound on δw[τ ] (= δw) if τ is too small.
5 Numerical Simulations
This section provides simulation results that confirm and sharpen the theoretical predictions made
in Section 3. Our simulations reveal (i) a sharp threshold at connectivity d ≈ 1.0 log2 n with no
stark effect of competition observed for d below this threshold, and (ii) that our findings hold even
for small values of n. We also investigate the role of imbalance k. Finally, we observe that the
connectivity in the actual high school admissions data resembles that in a market with n = 500
and d = 7  log2 500 ≈ 40, providing some explanation for why that dataset does not exhibit a
stark effect of competition.
We first examine the effect of connectivity on stable matchings in a random matching market
of a fixed size. Specifically, we consider a market with 1,000 men and 1,001 women (n = 1001,
k = −1) where the length of each man’s preference list d varies from 5 to 150. For each degree d we
generate 500 random realizations of matching markets according to the generative model described
in Section 2, and for each realization we compute the MOSM via the men-proposing DA algorithm.
Figure 4 reports the men’s average rank of wives and the women’s average rank of husbands (left)
and the number of unmatched men and women (right) at each d. While not reported here to
avoid cluttering the figures, we observe almost identical results for the WOSM. Observe that when
d < log2 n both men’s average rank and women’s average rank are highly concentrated at
√
d and
both the number of unmatched men and the number of unmatched women are close to ne−
√
d,
which confirms the estimates in Theorem 1. As d grows beyond log2 n, the average rank of men
and women start to deviate from each other, and specifically, the average rank of short side (men)
stops increasing whereas the average rank of long side (women) increases linearly: i.e., RMEN ≈ log n
and RWOMEN ≈ dlogn when d > log2 n, confirming Theorem 2. We also remark that the number of
unmatched men quickly vanishes as d increases beyond log2 n (note that the y-axis of the plot has
a log-scale).
The above observation extends to a wide range of market size n (even for small n ≤ 50). To
better illustrate, we investigate three kinds of threshold degree levels d∗rank(n), d
∗
δ(n), and d
∗
conn(n)
that sharply characterize the phase transitions that occur when degree d varies in random matching
markets of size n. We define these thresholds as follows: given that k = −1 as above,
d∗rank(n) = min
d
{En,d[RWOMEN(MOSM)]/En,d[RMEN(MOSM)] ≥ 1.15} , (2)
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Figure 4: Men’s average rank of wives RMEN and women’s average rank of husbands RWOMEN (left)
and the number of unmatched men δm and the number of unmatched women δw (right) under
MOSM in random matching markets with 1,000 men and 1,001 women (n = 1001, k = −1), and
a varying length of men’s preference list d. In both figures, solid lines indicate the average value
across 500 random realizations, and gray dashed lines indicate our theoretical predictions (Theorem
1 and 2) annotated with their expressions. In the left figure, the shaded areas surrounding solid
lines represent the range between the top and bottom 10th percentiles of 500 realizations of men’s
and women’s average rank.
d∗δ(n) = min
d
{En,d[δm] ≤ 0.5} , (3)
d∗conn(n) = min
d
{En,d[the number of connected components] ≤ 2} , (4)
where En,d[·] represents the expected value of some random variable in a random matching market
with n− 1 men each of whose degree is d and n women. The rank-gap threshold d∗rank(n) indicates
the degree value beyond which men’s average rank and women’s average rank start to deviate from
each other (in particular, we require a 15% or larger difference in the average ranks on the two
sides of the market); the unmatched-man threshold d∗δ(n) is the degree value beyond which all men
are (typically) matched; and the connectivity threshold d∗conn(n) is the degree value beyond which
the entire market is typically connected. We quantify these threshold values based on numerical
simulations. More specifically, we vary the number of men n from 10 to 2,500, and for each n we
use bisection method with a varying d to find the threshold degrees, where the expected values are
approximated with sample averages across 500 random realizations. We find that bisection method
is adequate since each of the measures on which the above thresholds are defined is observed to
monotonically increase or decrease in d, and further to change rapidly near the threshold value d∗
that we want to estimate.
Figure 5 plots the measured threshold degrees. Remarkably, the thresholds d∗rank(n) and d
∗
δ(n)
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are very close to log2 n for all tested values of n. This suggests that our predicted threshold is
fairly sharp: the short-side advantage emerges if and only if d & 1.0 × log2 n. Also note that this
threshold is much larger than the connectivity threshold d∗conn(n) ≈ log n.
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Figure 5: Threshold degrees d∗rank(n), d
∗
δ(n), and d
∗
conn(n), defined in (2)–(4), in random matching
markets with n− 1 men and n women where n ranges from 10 to 2,500. For each n, the threshold
values are found using bisection method in which we simulate 500 realizations at each attempted
d. The gray dashed lines indicate the theoretical predictions annotated with their expressions.
We next investigate the effect of imbalance k on the stable outcomes and characterize it at
the different levels of connectivity d. Analogous to the numerical experiment for the high school
admissions discussed in Section 1, we fix the number of women n = 500 (so log2 n ≈ 40), and
measure men’s average rank under MOSM (averaged across 500 realizations) where the number of
men varies from 450 to 550. To facilitate easier comparison, we compute the normalized average
rank RMEN/d: e.g., RMEN/d ≈ 0.2 implies that in average a man is matched to his top-20% most
preferred woman out of his preference list. Figure 6 shows how the (normalized) men’s average
rank changes as we add or remove men in the market, tested with different values of d. Observe
that for large d > log2 n (e.g., d = 100, 450) there is a stark effect when we inject a slight imbalance
into the balanced market; compare 500 men vs. 501 men. In contrast, for small d < log2 n (e.g.,
d = 10, 20), the stable outcome changes very “smoothly” across a wide range of imbalance, which
is consistent with simulation results based on high school admissions data (see Figure 1).
We conclude this section by providing some statistics that illustrate the level of connectivity in
the high school admissions example and showing that random matching markets with n = 500 and
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Figure 6: The effect of imbalance k on men’s average rank in random matching markets with a
fixed number of women n = 500 (log2 n ≈ 40). For each d ∈ {10, 20, 40, 100, 450}, the corresponding
curve reports men’s average rank under MOSM normalized by d, i.e., E[RMEN(MOSM)]/d, where
the number of men varies from 450 to 550 (i.e., k = −50, . . . , 50). Each data point reports the
average value across 500 realizations.
d = 7 exhibit a similar level of connectivity. We focus on the pairwise distance among students
as a measure of the connectivity of a matching market: e.g., the distance between two students
is one hop if they applied to the same program. On the actual high school admissions data, we
sample 1,000 students out of total 75,202 students, and measure the distance from each of selected
students to all the other 75,201 students. We observe that 10.1% of student pairs are within 1 hop,
97.8% of pairs are within 2 hops, and 100.0% of pairs are within 3 hops. (Recall that the average
preference list length in this high school admissions data was 6.9.) We apply the same analysis
on our random matching market model and find that the model with n = 500 and d = 7 yields a
comparable outcome: 9.4% of man pairs are within 1 hop, 98.1% of pairs are within 2 hops, and
100.0% of pairs are within 3 hops. Given that log2 n ≈ 40 for n = 500, far in excess of d = 7,
and since correlation in preferences seems only to reduce the effect of competition (see evidence in
Figure 1), we deduce that the high school admissions market seems to lie well within the “no stark
effect” regime covered by Theorem 1, which provides an explanation as to why we do not see a
stark effect of competition (Figure 1).
23
6 Discussion
We investigated stable matchings in random matching markets which are partially connected, and
asked which random matching markets exhibit a stark effect of competition. In particular, unlike
many previous papers which study whether there is a nearly unique stable matching, we focus
on the issue of how well (or poorly) agents do under stable matching, as a function of market
primitives. The parameter d captured the connectivity (average degree), n captured the market
size and k captured the imbalance, whereas preferences were assumed to be uniformly random
and independent. We found that, in densely connected markets d = ω(log2 n), the short side of
the market enjoys a significant advantage, generalizing the finding of Ashlagi et al. (2017) in fully
connected markets. In contrast, in moderately connected markets d = o(log2 n), we found that for
any k = o(n), the two sides of the market do almost equally well, challenging the claim of Ashlagi
et al. (2017) that “matching markets are extremely competitive”. Notably, this “no stark effect of
competition” regime extends far beyond the connectivity threshold of d = log n and thus includes
well connected markets. Numerical simulation results not only support our theory but further
indicate that our findings extend to small n and that there is a sharp threshold between the two
regimes at d ≈ 1.0 log2 n. We argued informally that most real world matching markets lie in the
no stark effect of competition regime, providing some explanation why matching market datasets
do not exhibit a stark effect of competition.
Following the theoretical matching literature, we have analyzed a highly stylized model in the
interest of tractability and obtaining sharp results. (Even so, we encounter and overcome significant
new technical challenges.) We leave as interesting and challenging directions for future work to
characterize stable matchings while incorporating various features of real world market such as
many-to-one matching, correlation in preferences, and small market sizes.
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Appendix to “Which Random Matching Markets
Exhibit a Stark Effect of Competition?”
Organization of the appendix. The technical appendix is organized as follows.
• Appendix A describes several concentration inequalities and auxiliary stochastic processes
that will be heavily used in the following theoretical analysis.
• Appendix B establishes Theorem 1, the main result for moderately connected markets. The
proof is lengthy and will be further divided into several steps, with an overview provided at
the beginning of each step.
• Appendix C establishes Theorem 2, the main result for densely connected markets.
A Preliminaries
A.1 Basic Inequalities
Lemma 1. The following inequalities hold:
• For any |x| ≤ 12 , we have e−x−x
2 ≤ 1− x ≤ e−x.
• For any k > 0 and  ∈ (0, 1k), we have 1 + k ≤ 11−k .
A.2 Negative Association of Random Variables
The concept of negative association provides a stronger notion of negative correlation, which is
useful to analyze the concentration of the sum of dependent random variables.
Definition 2 (Negatively Associated Random Variables (Dubhashi and Ranjan 1998)). A set of
random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn are negatively associated (NA) if for any two disjoint index sets
I, J ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
E [f(Xi : i ∈ I) · g(Xj : j ∈ J)] ≤ E [f(Xi : i ∈ I)] · E [g(Xj : j ∈ J)]
for any two functions f : R|I| 7→ R and g : R|J | 7→ R that are both non-decreasing or both non-
increasing (in each argument).
The following lemma formalizes that the sum of negatively associated (NA) random variables
is as concentrated as the sum of independent random variables:
Lemma 2 (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound for Negatively Associated Random Variables (Dubhashi
and Ranjan 1998)). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be NA random variables with Xi ∈ [ai, bi] always. Then,
S,
∑n
i=1Xi satisfies the following tail bound:
P (|S − E[S]| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2t
2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
. (5)
We refer to Dubhashi and Ranjan (1998) for the proof.
The following lemma provides sufficient conditions for a set of random variables to be NA. For
each sufficient condition, we provide a pointer to a paper where it has been established.
Lemma 3 (Sufficient Conditions for Negative Association). The followings hold:
1
(i) (Permutation distribution (Joan-Dev and Proschan 1983, Theorem 2.11)) Let x1, x2, . . . , xn
be n real numbers and let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be random variables such that (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is
a uniformly random permutation of (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Then X1, X2, . . . , Xn are NA.
(ii) (Union of independent sets of NA random variables (Joan-Dev and Proschan 1983, Property
7)) If X1, X2, . . . , Xn are NA, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym are NA, and {Xi}i are independent of {Yj}j,
then X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Ym are NA.
(iii) (Concordant monotone functions (Joan-Dev and Proschan 1983, Property 6)) Increasing
functions defined on disjoint subsets of a set of NA random variables are NA. More pre-
cisely, suppose f1, f2, . . . , fk are all non-decreasing in each coordinate, or all non-increasing
in each coordinate, with each fj : R|Ij | 7→ R defined on (Xi)i∈Ij for some disjoint index
subsets I1, . . . , Ik ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If X1, X2, . . . , Xn are NA, then the set of random variables
Y1 , f1(Xi : i ∈ I1), Y2 , f2(Xi : i ∈ I2), . . . , Yk , fk(Xi : i ∈ Ik) are NA.
A.3 Balls-into-bins
A balls-into-bins process with T balls and n bins is defined as follows: at each time t = 1, . . . , T , a
ball is placed into one of n bins uniformly at random, independently of the past. Index the bins by
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let Ij,t be an indicator variable that equals one if the tth ball is placed in the
jth bin and equals zero otherwise. Further define Wj ,
∑T
t=1 Ij,t representing the total number of
balls placed into the jth bin.
A particular random variable of interest is the number of empty bins at the end of the process,
for which we have the following concentration inequality.
Lemma 4 (Number of empty bins). Let X be the number of empty bins at the end of a balls-into-
bins process with T balls and n bins. For any  > 0, we have
P
(
1
n
X −
(
1− 1
n
)T
≥ 
)
≤ exp (−2n2) ,
P
(
1
n
X −
(
1− 1
n
)T
≤ 
)
≤ exp (−2n2) .
Proof. Observe that {Ij,t}j∈{1,...,n},t∈{1,...,T} are negatively associated (NA) since {Ij,t}j∈{1,...,n} are
NA for each t (by Lemma 3–(i), since {Ij,t}j∈{1,...,n} is a uniformly random permutation of n−1 zeros
and a single one) and they are independent across t (Lemma 3–(ii)). Consequently, W1, . . . ,Wn are
NA due to Lemma 3–(iii), since fj(Ij,1, . . . , Ij,T ),
∑T
t=1 Ij,t is non-decreasing in each coordinate.
Define Yj , I(Wj = 0) indicating whether the jth bin is empty at the end. Although Yj ’s are
not independent, they are NA (again, by Lemma 3–(iii)). Because Yj ∼ Bernoulli
((
1− 1n
)T)
and
X =
∑n
j=1 Yj , by applying Hoeffding’s bound (Lemma 2), we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 5. Let Wj denotes the number of balls in the j
th bin at the end of a balls-into-bins process
with T balls and n bins. For any ∆ > 0, we have
P
 1
n
n∑
j=1
1
Wj + 1
≥ n
T
+ ∆
 ≤ exp (−2n∆2) .
2
Proof. Since Wj ∼ Binomial
(
T, 1n
)
, we have
E
[
1
Wj + 1
]
=
T∑
k=0
1
k + 1
×
(
T
k
)(
1
n
)k (
1− 1
n
)T−k
=
n
T + 1
T∑
k=0
(
T + 1
k + 1
)(
1
n
)k+1(
1− 1
n
)(T+1)−(k+1)
=
n
T + 1
×
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)T+1)
≤ n
T
.
In the proof of Lemma 4, we have shown thatW1, . . . ,Wn are NA. By Lemma 3–(iii),
1
W1+1
, . . . , 1Wn+1
are also NA. Therefore, by applying Hoeffding’s bound (Lemma 2), we obtain the desired result.
A.4 Chernoff’s Bound on Random Sum
Lemma 6. Fix any p ∈ (0, 1) and any p′ ∈ (0, 1). Define the random sum
S ,
N∑
i=1
Xi ,
where Xi’s are i.i.d. random variables and have distribution
14 Geometric(p), and N ∼ Geometric(p′)
and is independent of Xi’s. Let Si’s be i.i.d. random variables and have the same distribution as
S, for λ > E[S] = 1/(pp′) we have
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Si ≥ λ
)
≤ exp
(
− n
2λ2
(λ− E[S])2
)
.
Proof. Denote q , 1 − p, q′ , 1 − p′. In the first step, we derive the moment generating function
of S, which we denote by M(t). Note that
M(t) = E[etS ] = E
[
et
∑N
i=1Xi
]
= E
[[
EetX
]N]
= E
[
γN
]
.
where
γ ,
{
pet
1−qet if qe
t < 1 ,
∞ otherwise . (6)
we have
E[γN ] =
∞∑
k=1
γk(1− p′)k−1p′ = p′γ
∞∑
k=1
γk−1(q′)k−1 =
{
p′γ
1−γq′ if γq
′ < 1 ,
∞ otherwise .
14Here, by Geometric(p) we mean the distribution P(Xi = k) = p(1 − p)k−1 for k ≥ 1, i.e., the support of the
distribution is {1, 2, . . . }, and its expectation is 1/p > 1.
3
By plugging in γ, we obtain
M(t) =

p′ pe
t
1−qet
1−q′ pet
1−qet
= p
′pet
1−et(q+q′p) if t < t¯ , log(1/(q + q′p)) ,
∞ otherwise .
Here we used that q+q′p > q to simplify the condition for M(t) to be finite to et(q+q′p) < 1⇔ t < t¯.
Now we derive the convex conjugate of logM(t), a.k.a. the large deviation rate function. Note
that E[S] = 1/(pp′). Define Λ∗ : [1/(pp′),∞)→ R as
Λ∗(λ) , sup
t≥0
(λt− logM(t)) = sup
t∈[0,t¯)
(λt− logM(t))
Fix λ ≥ 1/(pp′) and let t∗ be the maximizer of the supremum above. The derivative of λt− logM(t)
with respect to t for t ∈ [0, t¯) is
λ− 1− e
t(q + q′p)
1− et(q + q′p) = λ−
1
1− et(q + q′p) ,
and in particular it is decreasing in t, corresponding to the fact that λt− logM(t) is concave in t
(we already knew concavity holds because the log moment generating function is always convex).
Note further that the derivative at t = 0 is non-negative since
λ− 1
1− (q + q′p) = λ− 1/(pp
′) ≥ 0 ,
and that the derivative eventually becomes negative since it tends to −∞ as t → t¯−. Hence the
first order condition will give us the maximizer t∗ ∈ [0, t¯) of λt− logM(t) as follows:
λ =
1
1− et∗(q + q′p) ⇒ e
t∗ =
1− 1λ
q + q′p
.
Therefore, we have
Λ∗(λ) = λ log
(
1− 1
λ
)
− λ log (q + q′p)− log
p′p 1− 1λq+q′p
1/λ

= λ log
(
1− 1
λ
)
− λ log (q + q′p)− log (λ− 1) + C,
where C is a constant. A short calculation tells us that
dΛ∗
dλ
(λ) = log
(
1− 1
λ
)
− log (q + q′p) , d2Λ∗
dλ2
(λ) =
1
λ(λ− 1) . (7)
Let S1, · · · , Sn be i.i.d. random variables with the same distribution as S. Using Chernoff’s
bound, for λ ≥ E[S] we have
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Si ≥ λ
)
≤ exp (−nΛ∗(λ)) . (8)
Since Λ∗(·) is a large deviation rate function, we have that Λ∗(E[S]) = 0 and dΛ∗dλ (E[S]) = 0. We
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will now use Taylor’s theorem taking terms up to second order for Λ∗(λ) around E[S] to obtain the
desired bound. Note that at any λ′ ∈ (E[S], λ) , using the explicit form of d2Λ∗
dλ2
in (7) we have
d2Λ∗
dλ2
(λ′) ≥ 1
(λ′)2
≥ 1
λ2
,
where we used E[S] > 1. Now, using Taylor’s theorem, we know that for some λ′ ∈ (0, λ) we have
Λ∗(λ) =
1
2
d2Λ∗
dλ2
(λ′) (λ− E[S])2 ≥ 1
2λ2
(λ− E[S])2 .
Plugging into (8), we obtain
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Si ≥ λ
)
≤ exp
(
− n
2λ2
(λ− E[S])2
)
as required.
A.5 Notations and Preliminary Observations
We here introduce the variables that formally describe the state of a random matching market over
the course of the men-proposing deferred-acceptance (MPDA) procedure (Algorithm 1).
The time t ticks whenever a man makes a proposal. Let It ∈ M be the man who proposes at
time t, and Jt ∈ W be the woman who receives that proposal. We define Mi,t ,
∑t
s=1 I(Is = i) that
counts the number of proposals that a man i has made up to time t, and define Wj,t ,
∑t
s=1 I(Js =
j) that counts the number of proposals that a woman j has received up to time t. We will often
use ~Mt , (Mi,t)i∈M and ~Wt , (Wj,t)j∈W as vectorized notations. By definition, we have∑
i∈M
Mi,t =
∑
j∈W
Wj,t = t ,
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ τ where τ is the total number of proposals under MPDA.
Let Ht ⊆ W be the set of women that the man It had proposed to before time t: i.e., Ht , {Js :
Is = i for some s ≤ t − 1} and we have |Ht| < d.According to the principle of deferred decisions,
the tth proposal goes to one of women that the man It had not proposed to yet: i.e., Jt is sampled
from W \ Ht uniformly at random. And then, the proposal gets accepted by the woman Jt with
probability 1/(WJt,t−1 + 1).
We denote the current number of unmatched men and women at time t by δm[t] and δw[t],
respectively. More precisely, δm[t] represents the number of men who have exhausted all his pref-
erence list but left unmatched15 at time t: i.e., δm[t] ,
∑
i∈M I(Mi,t = d, µt(i) = i) where µt is
the current matching at time t. Also note that once a woman receives a proposal, she remains
matched until the end of MPDA procedure: i.e., δw[t] ,
∑
j∈W I(µt(j) = j) =
∑
j∈W I(Wj,t = 0).
We observe that δm[t] starts from zero (at t = 0) and is non-decreasing over time, and δw[t] starts
from n and is non-increasing over time.
Recall that τ is the the total number of proposals that is made until the end of MPDA, i.e.,
the time at which the men-optimal stable matching (MOSM) is found. MPDA ends when there
15It is important that the definition of δm[t] does not count the men who have not entered the market until time t.
In other words, it counts the number of men who are “confirmed” to be unmatched under MOSM, and correspond to
the variable δm described in Algorithm 1. This quantity is different from the number of unmatched men under the
current matching µt, which may decrease when a man proposes to a woman who has never received any proposal.
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is no more man to make a proposal, i.e., when every unmatched man had already exhausted his
preference list. In (1), we expressed τ as a stopping time, namely,
τ = min{t ≥ 1 : δm[t] = δw[t] + k} .
In particular, we have
δm[τ ] = δw[τ ] + k ,
since the number of matched men equals to the number of matched women under any feasible
matching. Furthermore, we have
RMEN(MOSM) =
τ + δm[τ ]
n+ k
,
by the definition of men’s rank.
An extended process. We introduce an extended process as a natural continuation of the MPDA
procedure that continues to evolve even after the MOSM is found (i.e., the extended process con-
tinues for t > τ). Recall that the MPDA procedure under the principle of deferred decisions works
as follows: As described in Algorithm 1, n + k men in M sequentially enter the market one by
one, and whenever a new man enters, he makes a proposal and the acceptance/rejection process
continues until all men who have entered are either matched or have reached the bottom of their
preference lists (i.e., until it finds a new MOSM among the men who have entered including the
newly entered man).
To define the extended process, we start by defining an extended market, which has the same
n women but an infinite supply of men: n + k “real” men M who are present in the original
market, and an infinity of “fake” men Mfake in addition. The distribution of preferences in the
extended market is again as described in Section 2 (in particular, the preference distribution does
not distinguish real and fake men). We then define the extended process as tracking the progress
of Algorithm 1 on the extended market: the n + k real men enter first in Algorithm 1, as before,
and we then continue Algorithm 1 after time τ for all t > τ by continuing to introduce additional
(fake) men sequentially after time τ . In particular, the extended process is identical to the original
MPDA process until the MOSM is found (i.e., for t ≤ τ).
Observe that in this extended process, the MOSM among M ∪ W can be understood as a
stable outcome found after n+ k men have entered the market. Therefore, all the aforementioned
notations (It, Jt, Mi,t, Wj,t, Ht, µt, δm[t], δw[t]) are well-defined for any time t ≥ 0 while preserving
all their properties characterized above, and we similarly denote by Mˆ[t] ⊂ M∪Mfake the set of
men who have entered so far (consistent with the notation in Algorithm 1). In the later proofs,
we utilize these notations and their properties (e.g., δm[τ ] ≤ δm[t] implies that τ ≤ t since δm[t] is
non-decreasing over time for t = 0, 1, . . .).
Balls-into-bins process analogy. When we analyze the women side, we heavily utilize the balls-
into-bins process as done in Knuth (1976). We make an analogy between the number of proposals
that each of n women has received (denoted by Wj,t) and the number of balls that had been placed
into each of n bins. For example, the number of unmatched women at time t corresponds to the
number of empty bins after t balls had been placed.
Recall that, according to the principle of deferred decisions, the tth proposal goes to one of
women uniformly at random among whom he had not yet proposed to (i.e., W \Ht), and thus the
recipients of proposals, J1, J2, . . ., are not independent. In the balls-into-bins process, in contrast,
the tth ball is placed into one of n bins uniformly at random, independently of the other balls’
6
placement. Despite this difference (sampling without replacement v.s. sampling with replacement),
the balls-into-bins process provides a good enough approximation as the number of proposals made
by an individual man (i.e., |Ht|) is much smaller than the total number of men and women. We
will show that (e.g., in Lemma 8 in the next section) that the corresponding error term can be
effectively bounded.
B Proof for Small to Medium-Sized d: the case of d = o(log2 n),
d = ω(1)
In this section, we consider the case such that d = o(log2 n) and d = ω(1). We will prove the
following quantitative version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Quantitative version of Theorem 1). Consider a sequence of random matching markets
indexed by n, with n+ k men and n women (k = k(n) can be positive or negative), and the men’s
degrees are d = d(n). If |k| = O(ne−
√
d), d = ω(1) and d = o(log2 n), then with probability
1−O(exp(−d 14 )) we have
1. (Men’s average rank of wives) ∣∣∣RMEN(MOSM)−√d∣∣∣ ≤ 6d 14 .
2. (Women’s average rank of husbands)∣∣∣RWOMEN(MOSM)−√d∣∣∣ ≤ 8d 14 .
3. (The number of unmatched men)∣∣∣log δm − log ne−√d∣∣∣ ≤ 3d 14 .
4. (The number of unmatched women)∣∣∣log δw − log ne−√d∣∣∣ ≤ 2.5d 14 .
The proofs are organized as follows:
• (Section B.1) We first show that with high probability, the stopping time of MPDA (Algo-
rithm 1), namely, τ , is bounded above as τ ≤ n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
, by utilizing the coupled extended
process defined in Section A.5. This yields a high probability upper bound on RMEN(MOSM)
and a lower bound on the number of unmatched men δm and unmatched women δw.
• (Section B.2) We prove the complementary bounds on RMEN(MOSM), δm, and δw: a lower
bound on RMEN(MOSM) and an upper bound on the number of unmatched men δ
m and
unmatched women δw. To this end, we start by analyzing the rejection chains triggered by
the last man to enter in MPDA, and deduce upper bounds on E[δm] and E[δw], using the
fact that the order in which men enter does not matter. Using Markov’s inequality, we then
obtain high probability upper bounds on δm and δw, which lead to lower bounds on τ and
RMEN(MOSM).
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• (Section B.3) We construct the concentration bounds on RWOMEN(MOSM) based upon the
concentration results on τ . In this step, we utilizes the balls-into-bins process to analyze the
women’s side while carefully controlling the difference between the MPDA procedure and the
balls-into-bins process. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
B.1 Step 1: Upper Bound on the Total Number of Proposals τ
We prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 (Upper bound on men’s average rank). Consider the setting of Theorem 1. With
probability 1−O(exp(−√n)), we have the following upper bounds on the total number of proposals
and men’s average rank:
τ ≤ n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
, RMEN(MOSM) ≤
√
d+ 2d
1
4 .
Proposition 2 (Lower bound on the number of unmatched women). Consider the setting of The-
orem 1. With probability 1− O(exp(−√n)), we have the following lower bounds on the number of
unmatched men δm and unmatched women δw:
δm ≥ n exp
(
−
√
d− 3d 14
)
, δw ≥ n exp
(
−
√
d− 2d 14
)
.
Throughout the proofs we utilize the extended process defined in Section A.5, which enables us
to analyze the state dynamics even after the termination of original DA procedure. Most of the work
is in proving Proposition 1, which is done in Sections B.1.1–B.1.4. We then deduce Proposition 2
from Proposition 1 in Section B.1.5. The overall proof structure is as follows:
• (Sections B.1.1 and B.1.2) We first analyze the women side using balls-into-bins process
analogy: Given that a sufficient number of proposals have been made (in particular, for
t = (1 + )n
√
d), we construct a high probability upper bound on the current number of
unmatched women δw[t] and the probability pt of a proposal being accepted.
• (Sections B.1.3 and B.1.4) We then analyze the men side and obtain a lower bound on the
current number of unmatched men δm[t] at t = (1 + )n
√
d by utilizing the upper bound on
acceptance probability pt. Since this lower bound exceeds the upper bound on δ
w[t] (plus
k) which holds at the same t, we deduce that, whp, the algorithm has already terminated,
τ ≤ t = (1 + )n√d, since we know that δm[τ ] = δw[τ ] + k. See Figure 3 in Section 4 for
illustration. Consequently, an upper bound on RMEN follows from the identity RMEN =
τ+δm
n+k ,
thus completing the proof of Proposition 1.
• (Section B.1.5) Given the upper bound on τ , we obtain a lower bound on δw using the balls-
into-bins analogy again. This leads to a lower bound on δm due to the identity δm = δw + k,
which completes the proof of Proposition 2.
B.1.1 Upper bound on number of unmatched women after a sufficient number of
proposals
The following result formalizes the fact that there cannot be too many unmatched women after a
sufficient number of proposals have been made.
8
Lemma 7. Consider the setting of Theorem 1 and the extended process defined in Section A.5.
For any  ∈ (0, 12) and n ∈ Z+, we have
P
(
δw[(1 + )n
√
d] > ne−(1+

2
)
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
nd2e−3
√
d
)
. (9)
In words, after t = (1 + )n
√
d proposals have been made, at most ne−(1+

2
)
√
d women remain
unmatched with high probability.
Proof. It is well known that for any t > 0, δw[t] is stochastically dominated by the number of empty
bins at the end of a balls-into-bins process (defined in Section A.3) with t balls and n bins, which
we denote by Xt,n. (See, e.g., Knuth (1996); the idea is that since men’s preference lists sample
women without replacement, the actual process has a weakly larger probability of proposing to
an unmatched woman at each step relative to picking a uniformly random woman, and hence a
stochastically smaller number of unmatched women at any given t.) Therefore we have
P
(
δw[(1 + )n
√
d] > ne−(1+

2
)
√
d
)
≤ P
(
X(1+)n
√
d,n > ne
−(1+ 
2
)
√
d
)
= P
(
1
n
X(1+)n
√
d,n −
(
1− 1
n
)(1+)n√d
> e−(1+

2
)
√
d −
(
1− 1
n
)(1+)n√d)
.
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, we further have
P
(
δw[(1 + )n
√
d] > ne−(1+

2
)
√
d
)
≤ P
(
1
n
X(1+)n
√
d,n −
(
1− 1
n
)(1+)n√d
> e−(1+

2
)
√
d − e−(1+)
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
−2n
(
e−(1+

2
)
√
d − e−(1+)
√
d
)2)
.
For 0 < a < b, using the convexity of function f(x) = e−x we have e−a − e−b ≥ e−b(b − a), and
therefore for  ∈ (0, 12) and any n ∈ Z+,
P
(
δw[(1 + )n
√
d] > ne−(1+

2
)
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
−2nd
(
− 
2
)2
e−2(1+)
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
nd2e−3
√
d
)
.
This concludes the proof.
B.1.2 Upper bound on ex-ante acceptance probability
We define the ex-ante acceptance probability as
pt ,
1
|W \ Ht|
∑
j∈W\Ht
1
Wj,t−1 + 1
. (10)
This is the probability that the tth proposal is accepted after the proposer It is declared but
the recipient Jt is not yet revealed (recall that It is the identity of the man who makes the t
th
proposal, Jt is the identity of the woman who receives it, and Ht is the set of women whom It
has previously proposed to). In the following lemma, we construct a high probability upper bound
9
on the summation in (10), and the subsequent lemma will use it to obtain an upper bound on
p(1+ 
2
)n
√
d for small .
Lemma 8. For any ∆ > 0 and t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ nd, we have
P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+
d2
n
+ ∆
 ≤ 2 exp(−n∆2
8d
)
.
This is also valid for the extended process (i.e., when t ≥ τ).
Proof. Consider a balls-into-bins process with t balls and n bins, and let J˜s ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the
index of bin into which the sth ball is placed, and let W˜j,t,
∑t
s=1 I(J˜s = j) be the total number
of balls placed in the jth bin. Recall that J˜s is being sampled from {1, . . . , n} (=W) uniformly at
random.
We make a coupling between the MPDA procedure and the balls-into-bins process as follows:
when determining the sth recipient Js, we take Js ← J˜s if J˜s /∈ Hs, or otherwise, sample Js among
W \Hs uniformly at random. In other words, the man Is first picks a woman J˜s among the entire
W uniformly at random, and then proposes to her only if he had not proposed to her yet; if he
already had proposed before, he proposes to another woman randomly sampled among W \Hs. It
is straightforward that the evolution of the recipient process Js under this coupling is identical to
that under the usual MPDA procedure.
Define Dt,
∑t
s=1 I(Js 6= J˜s) representing the total discrepancy between the MPDA proce-
dure and its coupled balls-into-bins process. Observe that I(J˜s 6= Js) = I
(
J˜s ∈ Hs
)
and thus
P
(
J˜s 6= Js
∣∣∣Fs−1) = P( J˜s ∈ Hs∣∣∣Fs−1) ≤ dn where Fs−1 represents all information revealed up to
time s − 1. Let Zs,Ds − dns and observe that (Ms)s≥0 is a supermartingale with Z0 = 0 and
|Zs+1 − Zs| ≤ 1. By Azuma’s inequality, we have for any ∆0 > 0,
P
(
Dt ≥ dt
n
+ ∆0
)
≤ P(Zt − Z0 ≥ ∆0) ≤ exp
(
−∆
2
0
2t
)
.
On the other hand, since 0 ≤ 1w+1 ≤ 1 for any w ≥ 0, we deduce that
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
−
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
≤
∑
j∈W:Wj,t<W˜j,t
(
1
Wj,t + 1
− 1
W˜j,t + 1
)
≤
∣∣∣{j ∈ W : Wj,t < W˜j,t}∣∣∣ ≤ Dt ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that in order to observe Wj,t < W˜j,t for some j, at
least one mismatch {J˜s 6= Js} should take place. Based on the high probability upper bound on
Dt obtained above, we have for any ∆1 > 0,
P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
− 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
≥ dt
n2
+ ∆1
 ≤ P(Dt ≥ dt
n
+ n∆1
)
≤ exp
(
−n
2∆21
2t
)
.
(11)
We now utilize the result derived for the balls-into-bins process. From Lemma 5, we have for
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any ∆2 > 0,
P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
≥ n
t
+ ∆2
 ≤ exp (−2n∆22) .
Combined with (11),
P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+ ∆2 +
dt
n2
+ ∆1

≤ P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+ ∆2 +
dt
n2
+ ∆1,
1
n
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
<
n
t
+ ∆2

+ P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
≥ n
t
+ ∆2

≤ P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
− 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
W˜j,t + 1
≥ dt
n2
+ ∆1
+ exp (−2n∆22)
≤ exp
(
−n
2∆21
2t
)
+ exp
(−2n∆22) ,
for any ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0.
We are ready to prove the claim. Given any ∆ > 0, take ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆/2. Then,
P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+
d2
n
+ ∆

≤ P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+
dt
n2
+ ∆1 + ∆2

≤ exp
(
−n
2∆21
2t
)
+ exp
(−2n∆22)
= exp
(
−n
2∆2
8t
)
+ exp
(
−1
2
n∆2
)
≤ exp
(
−n∆
2
8d
)
+ exp
(
−1
2
n∆2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−n∆
2
8d
)
,
where we utilized the fact that dt
n2
≤ d2n and nd ≤ n
2
t under the given condition t ≤ nd.
Lemma 9. Fix any α ∈ (0, 1),  < 0.2 and sequences (d(n))n∈N, and (γ(n))n∈N such that d =
d(n) = ω(1) and d = o(log2 n), and γ = γ(n) = Θ (n−α). Define the maximal ex-ante acceptance
probability (for any t ≤ nd) as
pt, maxH⊂W:|H|≤d
 1|W \ H| ∑
j∈W\H
1
Wj,t−1 + 1
 . (12)
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Then there exists n0 <∞ such that for all n > n0, we have
P
(
p(1+ 
2
)n
√
d ≥
1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
.
This is also valid for the extended process (i.e., when (1 + 2)n
√
d ≥ τ).
Proof. Let t,(1 + 2)n
√
d and H∗ be the maximizer of (12). Observe that |W \ H∗| ≥ n − d and∑
j∈W\H∗
1
Wj,t−1+1 ≤
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t−1+1 , and hence
pt =
1
|W \ H∗|
∑
j∈W\H∗
1
Wj,t−1 + 1
≤ 1
n− d
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t−1 + 1
≤ 1
n− d
1 + ∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
 .
The last inequality uses that at most one of the terms in the summation decreases from t− 1 to t,
and the decrease in that term is less than 1.
Let r , tn = (1 +

2)
√
d, and ∆ , γ
2
√
d
. Under the specified asymptotic conditions, for n large
enough we have
r∆ = (1 + 2)
√
d · γ
2
√
d
≤ 0.6γ , r
n
=
(1 + 2)
√
d
n
≤ 0.1γ , rd
2
n
≤ (1 +

2)d
5/2
n
≤ 0.1γ , d
n
≤ 0.1γ .
Consequently, since γ = o(1), for large enough n we have
n
n− d
(
1
r
+
d2
n
+ ∆ +
1
n
)
=
1
1− d/n ·
1
r
·
(
1 +
rd2
n
+ r∆ +
r
n
)
≤ 1
r
· 1
1− 0.1γ · (1 + 0.1γ + 0.6γ + 0.1γ)
≤ 1
r
· (1 + γ) = 1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d
.
As a result,
P
(
p(1+ 
2
)τ∗ ≥
1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d
)
≤ P
 1
n− d
1 + ∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
 ≥ 1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d

≤ P
 1
n− d
1 + ∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
 ≥ n
n− d ×
(
1
r
+
d2
n
+ ∆ +
1
n
)
= P
 1
n
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t + 1
≥ n
t
+
d2
n
+ ∆

≤ 2 exp
(
−n∆
2
8d
)
= 2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 8.
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B.1.3 Lower bound on the number of unmatched men after a sufficient number of
proposals
The following result formalizes the fact that there cannot be too few unmatched men after an
enough number of proposals have been made.
Lemma 10. Consider the setting of Theorem 1 and the extended process defined in Section A.5.
For any sequence ((n))n∈N such that  = (n) < 0.2 and (n) = ω
(
1
n0.49
)
, there exists n0 <∞ such
that for all n > n0, we have
P
(
δm[(1 + )n
√
d] ≤ 
16
ne−(1−

3
)
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) . (13)
In words, after (1+)n
√
d proposals have been made, at least 16ne
−(1− 
3
)
√
d men become unmatched
with high probability.
Proof. Let τ∗ , n
√
d. To obtain a lower bound on the number of unmatched men at time (1+)τ∗,
we count the number of d-rejection-in-a-row events that occur during [(1 + 2)τ
∗, (1 + )τ∗]. This
will provide a lower bound since whenever the rejection happens d times in a row the number of
unmatched men increases at least by one.
For this purpose, we first utilize the upper bound on the ex-ante acceptance probability. By
Lemma 9 we have: given that γ = γ(n) = Θ
(
1
nα
)
for some α ∈ (0, 1),  = (n) < 0.2, and that
d = d(n) = ω(1) and d = o(log2 n), there exists n0 > 0 such that for all n > n0,
P
(
p(1+ 
2
)τ∗ ≥
1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
. (14)
Let pˆ , 1+γ
(1+ 
2
)
√
d
and consider the events where p(1+ 
2
)τ∗ ≤ pˆ is satisifed. Since pt is non-
increasing over time on each sample path, we have pt ≤ pˆ for all t ≥ (1 + 2)τ∗ on this sample path:
i.e., a proposal after time (1 + 2)τ
∗ is accepted with probability at most pˆ.
As an analogy, we imagine a coin tossing process with head probability pˆ (which is an exaggera-
tion of the actual acceptance probability, making it underestimate the occurrence of rejections and
provides a valid lower bound on the actual number of d-rejection-in-a-row events), and count how
many times d-tail-in-a-row takes place during 2τ
∗ coin tosses. With Xi
i.i.d.∼ Geometric(pˆ) represent-
ing the number of coin tosses required to observe one head (acceptance), the total number of coin
tosses required to observe one d-tail-in-a-row is given by
∑N
i=1 min{Xi, d} where N is the smallest
i such that Xi > d. Note that N ∼ Geometric
(
(1− pˆ)d
)
. However, N is correlated with Xi’s. To
upper bound the random sum, observe that conditioned on N , {X1, · · · , XN−1} are independent
truncated Geomtric(pˆ) variables that only take value on {1, · · · , d}, which are stochastically dom-
inated by Geomtric(pˆ) random variables. Since min{XN , d} ≤ d, the random sum of interest is
stochastically dominated by d+ S, where S =
∑N ′
i=1Xi , and N
′ ∼ Geometric
(
(1− pˆ)d
)
indepen-
dent of Xi’s. (Note that by Wald’s identity we have E[S] = pˆ−1 (1− pˆ)−d.) Consequently, the total
number of coin tosses required to observe 8ne
−dpˆ d-tail-in-a-row’s is stochastically dominated by

8
ne−dpˆ∑
j=1
(d+ Sj) ,
where S1, S2, . . . are i.i.d. random variables with the same distribution as S defined above.
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Let R denote the total number of d-tail-in-a-row events that occur during [(1 + 2)τ
∗, (1 + )τ∗].
From the above argument, we deduce that
P
(
R ≤ 
8
ne−dpˆ
)
≤ P
 8ne−dpˆ∑
j=1
(d+ Sj) ≥ 
2
τ∗
 = P
 8ne−dpˆ∑
j=1
Sj ≥ 
2
τ∗ − 
8
nde−dpˆ
 . (15)
We now proceed to bound the RHS of (15). Note that

2τ
∗ − 8nde−dpˆ

8ne
−dpˆ =
4n
√
d
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
− d = 4
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d − d .
Recall that γ = Θ
(
1
nα
)
,  < 0.2, and d = ω(1), we have for large enough n, 4
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d − d >
3.9
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
. Plugging λ, 3.9
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
into Lemma 6, we obtain
P
 8ne−dpˆ∑
j=1
Sj ≥ 
2
τ∗ − 
8
nde−dpˆ
 ≤ exp(− 8ne−dpˆ
2λ2
(λ− E[S])2
)
≤ exp
(
−n
16
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
(
1− E[S]
λ
)2)
. (16)
We also have pˆ = 1+γ
(1+ 
2
)
√
d
= o(1) and thus for large enough n,
(1− pˆ)−d ≤
(
e−pˆ−pˆ
2
)−d
= e
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d+
(
1+γ
1+ 2
)2
,
where we use the fact that 1− x ≥ e−x−x2 for any |x| ≤ 0.5. Further observe that for large enough
n,
1 + 2
1 + γ
e
(
1+γ
1+ 2
)2
≤ 1.2e < 3.3 ,
and therefore,
E[S] = pˆ−1 (1− pˆ)−d ≤ 1 +

2
1 + γ
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d+
(
1+γ
1+ 2
)2
≤ 3.3
√
de
1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
.
For RHS of (16), we deduce that for large enough n,
exp
(
−n
16
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
(
1− E[S]
λ
)2)
≤ exp
(
−n
16
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
(
1− 3.3
3.9
)2)
≤ exp
(
− n
800
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
.
Combining all these results, for large enough n, we obtain
P
(
R ≤ 
8
ne−dpˆ
)
≤ exp
(
− n
800
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
.
As a result, we obtain a high probability lower bound on the number of unmatched men for the
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sample paths satisfying p(1+ 
2
)τ∗ ≤ pˆ:
P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
8
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
∣∣∣∣ p(1+ 2 )τ∗ ≤ 1 + γ(1 + 2)√d
)
≤ P
(
R ≤ 
8
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
− n
800
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
.
Combining with (14), we obtain
P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
8
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
8
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
∣∣∣∣ p(1+ 2 )τ∗ ≤ 1 + γ(1 + 2)√d
)
+ P
(
p(1+ 
2
)τ∗ ≥
1 + γ
(1 + 2)
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
− n
800
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
+ 2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
.
Now we take γ = n−1/5. First observe that, for large enough n, since d = o(log2 n), we have
2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
= 2 exp
(
− 1
32
n3/5
d2
)
≤ 1
2
exp
(−√n) ,
and furthermore, since  < 0.2,
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d ≥ e−(1+γ)(1− 3 )
√
d = e−(1−

3
)γ
√
d · e−(1− 3 )
√
d ≥ 1
2
e−(1−

3
)
√
d .
Therefore, we obtain
P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
16
ne−(1−

3
)
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
8
ne
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
− n
800
e
− 1+γ
1+ 2
√
d
)
+ 2 exp
(
−γ
2
32
n
d2
)
≤ exp
(
− n
1600
e−(1−

3
)
√
d
)
+
1
2
exp
(−√n)
≤ exp
(
− n
1600
e−
√
d
)
+
1
2
exp
(−√n) .
Given that  = ω( 1
n0.49
), we further have for large enough n,
n
1600
e−
√
d ≥ 1
1600
n0.51e−
√
d ≥ √n+ log 2 ,
thus,
exp
(
− 
1600
ne−2
√
d
)
≤ 1
2
exp
(−√n) ,
which concludes the proof.
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B.1.4 Upper bound on the total number of proposals τ and men’s average rank RMEN
(Proposition 1)
With the help of the coupling between the extended process and the men-proposing DA, we are
now able to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We make use of Lemma 7. Denote n
√
d by τ∗. Plug  = d−
1
4 in (9). For
the RHS of (9) we have
exp
(
−1
2
nd2e−3
√
d
)
= exp
(
−1
2
n
√
de−3
√
d
)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
ne−3
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) .
Here the last inequality holds because d = o(log2 n), and it follows that for any α > 0, e−3
√
d =
ω
(
1
nα
)
. Therefore,
P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] > ne−
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) . (17)
We further utilize Lemma 10. Plug  = d−
1
4 in (13). For the LHS of (13), because 116
1
xe
1
3
x ≥ e 14x
for large enough x, we have for large enough n,

16
ne−(1−

3
)
√
d =
1
16
ne−
√
dd−
1
4 e
1
3
d
1
4 ≥ ne−
√
de
1
4
d
1
4 ,
and hence
P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ ne−
√
de
1
4
d
1
4
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + )τ∗] ≤ 
16
ne−(1−

3
)
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) . (18)
Note that by assumption on the imbalance k, i.e., |k| = O(ne−
√
d), there exists some constant
C such that |k| ≤ Cne−
√
d for large enough n. Consequently, since C + 1 ≤ e 14d
1
4 for large enough
d (and hence for large enough n as d = ω(1)), we have for large enough n,
|k| ≤ Cne−
√
d ≤ ne−
√
d
(
e
1
4
d
1
4 − 1
)
.
Recall that τ is the smallest t such that
δm[t]− δw[t] = k ,
where the process δm[t]− δw[t] is non-decreasing over time. Therefore, we have
P
(
τ ≥ (1 + d− 14 )τ∗
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗]− δw[(1 + d− 14 )τ∗] ≤ k
)
= P
(
δm[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗]− δw[(1 + d− 14 )τ∗] ≤ k, δw[(1 + d− 14 )τ∗] ≤ ne−
√
d
)
+ P
(
δm[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗]− δw[(1 + d− 14 )τ∗] ≤ k, δw[(1 + d− 14 )τ∗] > ne−
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] ≤ ne−
√
d + k
)
+ P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] > ne−
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δm[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] ≤ ne−
√
de
1
4
d
1
4
)
+ P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] > ne−
√
d
)
≤ 2 exp (−√n) ,
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where we made use of (17) and (18) in the last step.
As a result, when the imbalance satisfies |k| = O(ne−
√
d), with probability 1 − O(exp(−√n)),
we have
τ ≤ n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
.
By definition of RMEN(MOSM), we have
RMEN(MOSM) =
τ + δm
n+ k
≤ τ + n
n+ k
.
Hence for τ ≤ n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
, we have for large enough n,
RMEN(MOSM) ≤ n
n+ k
(√
d+ d
1
4 + 1
)
≤
(
1 + 0.5d−
1
4
)(√
d+ d
1
4 + 1
)
≤
√
d+ 2d
1
4 ,
where we utilized the fact that nn+k ≤ nn−|k| ≤ 11−Ce−√d ≤ 1+2Ce
−√d ≤ 1+0.5d− 14 for large enough
d.
B.1.5 Lower bounds on the number of unmatched women δw and unmatched men δm
(Proposition 2)
We now derive a lower on the number of unmatched women δw. Similar to the proof of Lemma 7,
we again make an analogy between balls-into-bins process and DA procedure, but we now consider
a variation of balls-into-bins process that exaggerates the effect of “sampling without replacement”
as opposed to the original balls-into-bins process that assumes sampling with replacement. The
lower bound on the number of empty bins in this process provides a lower bound on the number
of unmatched women δw, which immediately leads to a lower bound on the number of unmatched
men δm by the identity δm = δw + k.
Lemma 11. For any t ≥ d and ∆ > 0, we have
P
(
δw[t]
n− d −
(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
≤ −∆
)
≤ exp (−2(n− d)∆2) .
This is also valid for the extended process defined in Section A.5.
Proof. Note that the tth proposal goes to a woman chosen uniformly at random after excluding the
set of women Ht that the man has previously proposed to. Therefore,
P
(
tth proposal goes to one of unmatched women
∣∣∣ δw[t− 1],Ht) = δw[t− 1]
n− |Ht| ≤
δw[t− 1]
n− d ,
since |Ht| ≤ d. Consider a process δw[t] defined as
δw[t] = δw[t− 1]−Xt where Xt ∼ Bernoulli
(
min
{
δw[t− 1]
n− d , 1
})
.
Since the process δw[t] exaggerates the likelihood of an unmatched woman receiving a proposal and
hence exaggerates the likelihood of decrementing by 1 at each level, δw[t] stochastically dominates
δw[t]: i.e., P (δw[t] ≤ x) ≤ P (δw[t] ≤ x) for all x ∈ N. We also observe that δw[t] counts the number
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of empty bins in a process (we refer to it below as the original process) similar to balls-into-bins
process where d bins are occupied during the first d periods, and then the regular balls-into-bins
process begins with n− d empty bins. Consider Lemma 4 applied to the “modified” balls-into-bins
process of putting t′ balls into n−d bins, where the bins correspond to those which are not occupied
by the first d balls in the original process, and t′ is the total number of balls which go into these
bins in the original process up to t. Clearly, t′ ≤ t − d, since the first d balls do not go into these
bins. We hence deduce from Lemma 4 that
P
(
δw[t]
n− d −
(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
≤ −∆
)
≤ P
(
δw[t]
n− d −
(
1− 1
n− d
)t′
≤ −∆
)
≤ exp (−2(n− d)∆2) .
Lemma 12. Consider the setting of Theorem 1 and the extended process defined in Section A.5.
Then there exists n0 < ∞ such that for all n > n0, we have the following lower bounds on the
number of unmatched women:
P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )n
√
d] ≤ ne−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) , (19)
P
(
δw[(1− 5d− 14 )n
√
d] ≤ ne−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) . (20)
Proof. Let τ∗ , n
√
d.
Proof of (19). Fix t = (1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗ = (1 + d−
1
4 )n
√
d. For large enough n, we have
d
n
≤ d
e
√
d
≤ 0.1d− 14 , t− d
n− d ≤
t
n
· 1
1− d/n ≤
√
d · 1 + d
− 1
4
1− 0.1d− 14
≤
√
d(1 + 1.2d−
1
4 ).
Consequently, with ∆, e−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d, for large enough n we have
n− d
n
[(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
−∆
]
≥
(
1− d
n
)
·
[
exp
(
− t− d
n− d −
t− d
(n− d)2
)
− e−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d
]
≥ 1
2
·
[
exp
(
−
√
d(1 + 1.2d−
1
4 ) · (1 + 1/(n− d))
)
− e−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d
]
≥ 1
2
·
[
exp
(
−
√
d(1 + 1.4d−
1
4 )
)
− exp
(
−
√
d(1 + 2d−
1
4 )
)]
= e−
√
d × 1
2
·
(
exp
(
−1.4d 14
)
− exp
(
−2d 14
))
≥ e−
√
d × 1
2
· e−2d
1
4
(
2.0d
1
4 − 1.4d 14
)
= e−
√
d × e−2d
1
4 × 0.3d 14 ≥ e−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d .
In the second last inequality, we utilize the fact that e−a − e−b ≥ e−b(b − a) for any 0 < a < b.
Therefore, by Lemma 11,
P
(
δw[t] ≤ ne−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
= P
(
δw[t]
n
≤ e−(1+2d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
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≤ P
(
δw[t]
n
≤ n− d
n
((
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
−∆
))
≤ P
(
δw[t]
n− d −
(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
≤ −∆
)
≤ exp (−2(n− d)∆2) = exp(−2(n− d)e−2(1+d− 14 )√d) .
The claim follows from the fact that 2(n− d)e−2(1+d−
1
4 )
√
d ≥ √n for large enough n.
Proof of (20). Fix t = (1− 5d− 14 )τ∗ = (1− 5d− 14 )n√d. For large enough n, we have
d
n
≤ d
e
√
d
≤ 0.1d− 14 , t− d
n− d ≤
t
n
· 1
1− d/n ≤
√
d · 1− 5d
− 1
4
1− 0.1d− 14
≤
√
d(1− 4.8d− 14 ),
Consequently, with ∆, e−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d,
n− d
n
[(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
−∆
]
≥
(
1− d
n
)
·
[
exp
(
− t− d
n− d −
t− d
(n− d)2
)
− e−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d
]
≥ 1
2
·
[
exp
(
−
√
d(1− 4.8d− 14 ) · (1 + 1/(n− d))
)
− e−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d
]
≥ 1
2
·
[
exp
(
−
√
d(1− 4.6d− 14 )
)
− exp
(
−
√
d(1− 2.5d− 14 )
)]
= e−
√
d × 1
2
·
(
exp
(
4.6d
1
4
)
− exp
(
2.5d
1
4
))
(a)
≥ e−
√
d × 1
2
· e2.5d
1
4
(
4.6d
1
4 − 2.5d 14
)
≥ e−
√
d × e2.5d
1
4 × d 14 ≥ e−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d ,
for large enough n. Here (a) follows from the fact that f(x) = ex is convex hence f(x2)− f(x1) ≥
f ′(x1)(x2 − x1) for x2 > x1. Therefore, by Lemma 11,
P
(
δw[t] ≤ ne−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
= P
(
δw[t]
n
≤ e−(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δw[t]
n
≤ n− d
n
((
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
−∆
))
≤ P
(
δw[t]
n− d −
(
1− 1
n− d
)t−d
≤ −∆
)
≤ exp (−2(n− d)∆2) = exp(−2(n− d)e−2(1−2.5d− 14 )√d) .
The claim follows from the fact that 2(n− d)e−2(1−2.5d−
1
4 )
√
d ≥ √n for large enough n.
We are now able to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1 and the monotonicity of δw[t], we have for large enough
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n,
P
(
δw[τ ] ≤ e−2d
1
4 ne−
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δw[τ ] ≤ e−2d
1
4 ne−
√
d , τ ≤ (1 + d− 14 )τ∗
)
+ P
(
τ ≥ (1 + d− 14 )τ∗
)
≤ P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] ≤ e−2d
1
4 ne−
√
d
)
+ exp
(−√n) . (21)
Moreover, by Lemma 12, we have for large enough n,
P
(
δw[(1 + d−
1
4 )τ∗] ≤ e−2d
1
4 ne−
√
d
)
≤ exp (−√n) .
From (21), we conclude that with probability 1− 2 exp(−√n),
δw ≥ ne−
√
d−2d 14 .
Since |δm − δw| = |k| ≤ O(ne−
√
d), it follows that with probability 1− 2 exp(−√n),
δm ≥ ne−
√
d−3d 14 .
B.2 Step 2: Lower Bound on the Total Number of Proposals τ
In this section, we prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. Consider the setting in Theorem 1. With probability 1−O
(
exp
(
−d 14
))
,we have
the following upper bounds on the number of unmatched men δm and unmatched women δw:
δm ≤ n exp
(
−
√
d+ 2.5d
1
4
)
, δw ≤ n exp
(
−
√
d+ 2.5d
1
4
)
.
Proposition 4. Consider the setting of Theorem 1. With probability 1 − O
(
exp
(
−d 14
))
, we
have the following lower bound on the total number of proposals and men’s average rank under the
men-optimal stable matching:
τ ≥ n
(√
d− 5d 14
)
, RMEN(MOSM) ≥
√
d− 6d 14 .
The proofs of Proposition 3 and 4 have the following structure:
• (Sections B.2.1 and B.2.2) Proof of Proposition 3: We first derive an upper bound on the
expected number of unmatched men E[δm] in Lemma 13, utilizing the fact that the probability
of the last proposing man being rejected cannot be too large given that the total number of
proposals τ is limited by its upper bound (Proposition 1). We immediately deduce an upper
bound E[δw] by using the identity δm = δw + k. The high probability upper bounds on δm
and δw follow by applying Markov’s inequality.
• (Section B.2.3) Proof of Proposition 4: We obtain a lower bound on the total number of
proposals τ by showing that the current number of unmatched women δw[t] does not decay fast
enough (again argued with a balls-into-bins analogy) and hence it will violate the upper bound
on δw[τ ] (= δw) derived in Proposition 3 if τ is too small. The lower bound on τ immediately
translates into the lower bound on RMEN(MOSM) due to the identity RMEN(MOSM) =
τ+δm
n+k .
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B.2.1 Upper bound on the expected number of unmatched women E[δw]
Using a careful analysis of the rejection chains triggered by the last proposing man’s proposal, we
are able to derive an upper bound on the expected number of unmatched women.
Lemma 13. Consider the setting of Theorem 1. There exists n0 < ∞ such that for all n > n0,
we have the following upper bounds on the expected number of unmatched men and women under
stable matching
E[δm] ≤ n exp(−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4) , E[δw] ≤ n exp(−
√
d+ 1.5d1/4) . (22)
Proof. We will track the progress of the man proposing DA algorithm making use of the principle
of deferred decisions, and further make use of a particular sequence of proposals: we will specify
beforehand an arbitrary man i (before any information whatsoever is revealed), and then run DA
to convergence on the other men, before man i makes a single proposal. We will show that the
probability that the man i remains unmatched is bounded as
P(µ(i) = i) ≤ exp(−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4) (23)
for large enough n. This will imply that, by symmetry across men, the expected number of un-
matched men under stable matching will be bounded above as
E[δm] ≤ (n+ k) exp(−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4) .
Finally the number of unmatched women at the end is exactly δw = δm − k, and so
E[δw] = E[δm]− k ≤ (n+ k) exp(−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4)− k ≤ n exp(−
√
d+ 1.5d1/4)
for large enough n as required, using k = O(ne−
√
d). The rest of proof is devoted to establishing
(23).
Using Proposition 1, we have that with probability 1 − O(exp(−√n)), at the end of DA, τ is
bounded above as
τ ≤ n(√d+ d 14 ) , (24)
and using Proposition 2, we have that with probability 1−O(exp(−√n)),
δw ≥ ne−
√
d−2d 14 , (25)
at the end of DA. Note that if (24) holds at the end of DA, then the RHS of (24) is an upper bound
on t throughout the run of DA. Similarly, since the number of unmatched woman δw[t] is monotone
non-increasing in t, if (25) holds at the end of DA, then the RHS of (25) is a lower bound on δw[t]
throughout the run of DA. If, at any stage during the run of DA either (24) (with t instead of τ)
or (25) (with δw[t] instead of δw) is violated, declare a “failure” event E ≡ Eτ . By union bound, we
know that P(E) = O(exp(−√n)). For t ≤ τ , let Et denote the event that no failure has occurred
during the first t proposals of DA. We will prove (23) by showing an upper bound on the likelihood
that man i remains unmatched for sample paths where no failure occurs, and assuming the worst
(i.e., that i certainly remains unmatched) in the rare cases where there is a failure.
Run DA to convergence on men besides i. Now consider proposals by i. At each such proposal,
the recipient woman is drawn uniformly at random from among at least n − d + 1 “candidate”
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women (the ones to whom i has not yet proposed). Assuming Ect , we know that
t ≤ n(√d+ d 14 ) , (26)
and hence the total number of proposals received by candidate women is at most n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
, and
hence the average number of proposals received by candidate women is at most n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )/(n−
d + 1) ≤ √d(1 + d−1/4 + log2 n/n) ≤ √d(1 + 1.1d− 14 ) ≤ √d + 1.1d 14 for large enough n, using
d = o(log2 n). If the proposal goes to woman j, the probability of it being accepted is 1wj,t+1 .
Averaging over the candidate women and using Jensen’s inequality for the function f(x) = 1x+1 ,
the probability of the proposal being accepted is at least 1√
d+1.1d1/4+1
≥ 1√
d+1.2d1/4
. If the proposal
is accepted, say by woman j, this triggers a rejection chain. We show that it is very unlikely that
this rejection chain will cause an additional proposal to woman j (which will imply that it is very
unlikely that the rejection chain will cause i himself to be rejected): For every additional proposal
in the rejection chain, the likelihood that it goes to an unmatched woman far exceeds the likelihood
that it goes to woman j: if the current time is t′ and Ect′ holds, then, since all δw[t′] unmatched
women are certainly candidate recipients of the next proposal, the likelihood of the proposal being
to an unmatched woman is at least δw[t′] ≥ ne−
√
d−2d 14 ≥ √n times the likelihood of it being
to woman j for n large enough, using d = o(log2 n). Now if the proposal is to an unmatched
woman, this causes the rejection chain to terminate, hence the expected number of proposals to
an unmatched woman in the rejection chain is at most 1. We immediately deduce that if a failure
does not occur prior to termination of the chain, the expected number of proposals to woman j in
the rejection chain is at most 1√
n
. It follows that
P(i is displaced from j by the rejection chain triggered when j accepts his proposal)
≤ P(j receives a proposal in the rejection chain triggered)
≤ E[Number of proposals received by j in the rejection chain triggered]
≤ 1√
n
,
for n large enough. Overall, the probability of the proposal by i being “successful” in that it is
both (a) accepted, and then (b) man i is not pushed out by the rejection chain, is at least
1√
d+ 1.2d1/4
(
1− 1√
n
)
≤ 1√
d+ 1.3d1/4
,
for large enough n. Hence the probability of an unsuccessful proposal (if there is no failure) is at
most
1− 1√
d+ 1.3d1/4
≤ exp
{
− 1√
d+ 1.3d1/4
}
,
and so the probability of all d proposals being unsuccessful (if there is no failure) is at most
exp
{
− d√
d+ 1.3d1/4
}
≤ exp
{
−
√
d+ 1.3d1/4
}
.
Formally, what we have obtained is an upper bound on the quantity E
[
I(µ(i) = i)I(Ec)], namely,
E
[
I(µ(i) = i)I(Ec)] ≤ exp{−√d+ 1.3d1/4} .
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Since the probability of failure is bounded as P(E) ≤ O(exp(−√n)), the overall probability that
of man i remaining unmatched is bounded above as
P(µ(i) = i) ≤ E[I(µ(i) = i)I(Ec)]+ P(E)
≤ exp
{
−
√
d+ 1.3d1/4
}
+O(exp(−√n)) ≤ exp
{
−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4
}
for large enough n, i.e., the bound (23) which we set out to show.
B.2.2 Upper bound on the number of unmatched men δm and unmatched women δw
(Proposition 3)
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3. Recall the results in Lemma 13:
E[δm] ≤ n exp(−
√
d+ 1.4d1/4) , E[δw] ≤ n exp(−
√
d+ 1.5d1/4) . (27)
We use Markov’s inequality for each δm and δw:
P
(
δm > n exp(−
√
d+ 2.4d1/4)
)
≤ E[δ
m]
n exp(−√d+ 2.4d1/4) ≤ exp(−d
1/4) ,
P
(
δw > n exp(−
√
d+ 2.5d1/4)
)
≤ E[δ
w]
n exp(−√d+ 2.5d1/4) ≤ exp(−d
1/4) .
B.2.3 Lower bound on the number of total proposals τ (Proposition 4)
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the extended process defined in Appendix A.5, and let
δw[t] be the number of unmatched woman at time t of the extended process. Let τ be the time
when the men-optimal stable matching is found, i.e., δw = δw[τ ]. Let  , d−1/4. We have
P
(
τ < (1− 5)n
√
d
)
≤ P
(
τ < (1− 5)n
√
d, δw[τ ] < ne−(1−2.5)
√
d
)
+ P
(
δw[τ ] ≥ ne−(1−2.5)
√
d
)
≤ P
(
δw[(1− 5)n
√
d] < ne−(1−2.5)
√
d
)
+ P
(
δw[τ ] ≥ ne−(1−2.5)
√
d
)
. (28)
Here the last inequality holds because δw[t] is non-increasing over t on each sample path. It follows
from Proposition 3 that the second term on the RHS of (28) is O(e−d1/4).
It remains to bound the first term on the RHS of (28). By Lemma 12, we have
P
(
δw[(1− 5)n
√
d] < ne−(1−2.5)
√
d
)
≤ exp(−√n),
for large enough n. By plugging this in the RHS of (28), we obtain
P
(
τ < (1− 5)n
√
d
)
= O
(
exp(−d 14 )
)
. (29)
Note that by the definition of RMEN(MOSM), we have
RMEN(MOSM) ≥ τ
n+ k
.
Since |k| = O(ne−
√
d), using an argument similar to the one at the end of the proof of Proposition
23
1, we can deduce from (29) that
P
(
RMEN(MOSM) < (1− 6)
√
d
)
= O
(
exp
(− d 14 )) .
This concludes the proof.
B.3 Step 3: Upper and Lower Bounds on Women’s Average Rank RWOMEN
In this section, we prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 5 (Lower bound on women’s average rank). Consider the setting of Theorem 1. With
probability 1− 3n , we have the following lower bound on women’s average rank:
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≥
√
d− 3d 14 ,
Proposition 6 (Upper bound on women’s average). Consider the setting of Theorem 1. With
probability 1−O(exp(−d 14 )), we have the following upper bound on the women’s average rank:
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≤
√
d+ 8d
1
4 .
In order to characterize the women side, we introduce a different extended process which we call
the continue-proposing process that is slightly different from one introduced in Section A.5. Until
the MOSM is found (i.e., t ≤ τ), the continue-proposing process is identical to the original DA
procedure. After the MOSM is found (i.e., t > τ), the proposing man It is chosen arbitrarily among
the men who have not yet exhausted their preference list (i.e., {i ∈ M : Mi,t−1 < d}), and we let
him propose to his next candidate. We do not care about the matching nor the acceptance/rejection
after τ , since we only keep track of the number of proposals that each man has made, Mi,t, and
each woman has received, Wj,t. The continue-proposing process terminates at time t = (n + k)d,
when all men exhaust their preference lists.
To analyze the concentration of RWOMEN, we first construct upper and lower bounds on its
conditional expectation. More formally, we define
R¯[t] , 1
n
∑
j∈W
Wj,(n+k)d −Wj,t
Wj,t + 1
, (30)
where Wj,(n+k)d represents the degree of woman j in a random matching market so that Wj,(n+k)d−
Wj,t represents the number of remaining proposals that woman j will receive after time t. In Lemma
15, we prove that R¯[τ ] is concentrated around
√
d given τ ≈ n√d. In Lemma 16, we show that R¯[τ ]
(plus 1) is indeed the conditional expectation of RWOMEN given Wj,τ ’s and Wj,(n+k)d’s, and further
characterize the conditional distribution of RWOMEN given R¯[τ ], which leads to the concentration
bounds on RWOMEN. Within the proofs, we also utilize the fact that R¯[t] is decreasing over time on
each sample path.
B.3.1 Concentration of expected women’s average rank R¯t
We first state a preliminary lemma that will be used to show the concentration of R¯t.
Lemma 14. Fix any t and T such that t < T and positive numbers c1, . . . , cn such that cj ∈ [0, 1]
for all j, and define
Yt,T ,
∑
j∈W
cj(Wj,T −Wj,t).
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With S,
∑n
j=1 cj, we have
P
(
Yt,T ≥ (1 + )(T − t)S
n− d
∣∣∣∣ ~Wt) ≤ exp(−142 × (T − t)Sn
)
(31)
P
(
Yt,T ≤ (1− )(T − t)(S − d)
n− d
∣∣∣∣ ~Wt) ≤ exp(−142 × (T − t)(S − d)n− d
)
(32)
for any  ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Throughout this proof, we assume that W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t are revealed, i.e. we consider the
conditional probabilities/expectations given W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t. In addition, we assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤
. . . ≤ cn without loss of generality.
Proof of (31): We first establish an upper bound using a coupling argument. Recall that Wj,s
counts the number of proposals that a woman j had received up to time s, which is governed by
the recipient process Js. We construct a coupled process
(
W j,s
)
j∈W,s≥t that counts based on Js as
follows:
(i) Initialize W j,t ←Wj,t for all j.
(ii) At each time s = t + 1, t + 2, . . . , T , after the recipient Js is revealed (which is uniformly
sampled among W \Hs), determine Js ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n}:
• If Js ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n}, set Js ← Js.
• If Js ∈ {1, . . . , d}, sample Js according to the probability distribution ps(·) defined as
(the motivation for this definition is provided below)
ps(j) =

0 if j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
1
n−d
/ |{1,...,d}\Hs|
|W\Hs| if j ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n} ∩ Hs,(
1
n−d − 1|W\Hs|
)/ |{1,...,d}\Hs|
|W\Hs| if j ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n} \ Hs.
(iii) Increase the counter of Js instead of Js: i.e., W j,s ←W j,s−1 + I{Js = j} for all j.
In words, whenever a proposal goes to one of d women who have smallest cj values (i.e., when
Js ∈ {1, . . . , d}), we randomly pick one among the other n − d women (i.e., Js ∈ {d + 1, . . . , n})
and increase that woman’s counter W Js . Otherwise (i.e., when Js ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n}), we count the
proposal as in the original process. In any case, we have cJs ≥ cJs .
Note that we do not alter the proposal mechanism in this coupled process, but just count the
proposals in a different way. Therefore, we have∑
j∈W
cj(Wj,T −Wj,t) ≤
∑
j∈W
cj(W j,T −W j,t), (33)
Also note that the (re-)sampling distribution ps(·) was constructed in a way that Js is chosen
uniformly at random among {d + 1, . . . , n}, unconditioned on Js, independently of Hs. More
formally, we have for any j ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n} \ Hs,
P(Js = j|Hs) = P(Js = j|Hs) + P(Js = j|Hs, Js ∈ {1, . . . , d}) · P(Js ∈ {1, . . . , d}|Hs)
=
1
|W \ Hs| +
(
1
n− d −
1
|W \ Hs|
)
=
1
n− d.
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Similarly it can be verified that P(Js = j|Hs) = 1n−d also for any j ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n} ∩Hs. The fact
that |Hs| < d guarantees that ps(·) is a well-defined probability mass function. Therefore,
∑
j∈W
cj(W j,T −W j,t) d=
n∑
j=d+1
cjXj ,
where Xj ∼ Binomial
(
T − t, 1n−d
)
for j ∈ {d + 1, . . . , n}. Although Xj ’s are not independent,
they are negatively associated as in the balls-into-bins process (see Section A.3). For any λ ∈ R,
exp(λcjXj)’s are also NA due to Lemma 3–(iii), and therefore,
E
exp
λ n∑
j=d+1
cjXj
 ≤ n∏
j=d+1
E
[
eλcjXj
]
=
n∏
j=d+1
(
1− 1
n− d +
1
n− de
λcj
)T−t
≤
n∏
j=d+1
exp
(
− 1
n− d +
1
n− de
λcj
)T−t
= exp
(T − t)
−1 + 1
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
eλcj
 .
Since cj ∈ [0, 1] and ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for any x ∈ (−∞, 1], we have for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
−1 + 1
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
eλcj ≤ −1 + 1
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
(1 + λcj + λ
2c2j ) ≤
λ+ λ2
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj .
By Markov’s inequality, for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
P
 n∑
j=d+1
cjXj ≥ (1 + )T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj
 ≤ E
[
exp
(
λ
∑n
j=d+1 cjXj
)]
exp
(
λ(1 + )T−tn−d
∑n
j=d+1 cj
)
≤ exp
(T − t) · λ+ λ2n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj − λ(1 + )T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj

≤ exp
(λ2 − λ) · T − tn− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj
 .
By taking λ, 2 , we obtain
P
 n∑
j=d+1
cjXj ≥ (1 + )T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj
 ≤ exp
−1
4
2 × T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj
 .
Also note that
S
n
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
cj ≤ 1
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj .
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Therefore, together with (33),
P
(
Yt,T ≥ (1 + )(T − t)S
n− d
∣∣∣∣W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t) ≤ P
Yt,T ≥ (1 + )T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj
∣∣∣∣∣∣W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t

≤ exp
−1
4
2 × T − t
n− d
n∑
j=d+1
cj

≤ exp
(
−1
4
2 × (T − t)S
n
)
.
Proof of (32): Similarly to above, we can construct a coupled process
(
W j,s
)
s≥t under which Js
is resampled among {1, . . . , n − d} whenever a proposal goes to one of d women who have largest
cj values (i.e., when Js ∈ {n− d+ 1, . . . , n}) while P (Js = j|Hs) = 1n−d for any j ∈ {1, · · · , n− d}
and any Hs. With this process, we have
∑
j∈W
cj(Wj,T −Wj,t) ≥
∑
j∈W
cj(W j,T −W j,t) d=
n−d∑
j=1
cjXj ,
where Xj ∼ Binomial
(
T − t, 1n−d
)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n− d} and Xj ’s are NA.
For any λ ∈ [−1, 0],
E
exp
λ n−d∑
j=1
cjXj
 ≤ n−d∏
j=1
E
[
eλcjXj
]
=
n−d∏
j=1
(
1− 1
n− d +
1
n− de
λcj
)T−t
≤
n−d∏
j=1
exp
(
− 1
n− d +
1
n− de
λcj
)T−t
= exp
(T − t)
−1 + 1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
eλcj
 .
Since cj ∈ [0, 1] and ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for any x ∈ (−∞, 1], we have for any λ ∈ [−1, 0],
−1 + 1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
eλcj ≤ −1 + 1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
(1 + λcj + λ
2c2j ) ≤
λ+ λ2
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj .
Using Markov’s inequality, we have
P
n−d∑
j=1
cjXj ≤ (1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
 = P
exp
λ n−d∑
j=1
cjXj
 ≥ exp
λ(1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj

≤
E
[
exp
(
λ
∑n−d
j=1 cjXj
)]
exp
(
λ(1− )T−tn−d
∑n−d
j=1 cj
)
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≤ exp
(T − t) · λ+ λ2n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj − λ(1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj

≤ exp
(λ2 + λ) · T − tn− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
 .
With λ,− 2 , we obtain
P
n−d∑
j=1
cjXj ≤ (1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
 ≤ exp
−1
4
2 × T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
 .
Consequently, since S − d = ∑nj=1 cj − d ≤∑n−dj=1 cj ,
P
(
Yt,T ≤ (1− )(T − t)(S − d)
n− d
∣∣∣∣W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t) ≤ P
Yt,T ≤ (1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
∣∣∣∣∣∣W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t

≤ exp
−1
4
2 × T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj

≤ exp
(
−1
4
2 × (T − t)(S − d)
n− d
)
.
Lemma 15. Consider the setting of Theorem 1 and R¯[t] defined in (30). There exists n0 < ∞
such that for all n > n0, we have
P
(
R¯
[
n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )
]
≤
√
d− 2.3d 14
)
≤ exp
(
−n
8
)
. (34)
P
(
R¯
[
n(
√
d− 5d 14 )
]
≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
)
≤ exp
(
− n
d4
)
. (35)
Proof. Proof of (34): Fix t = n
(√
d+ d
1
4
)
and let S ,
∑
j∈W
1
Wj,t+1
. Due to the convexity of
f(x) , 1x+1 , we have for large enough d (i.e. large enough n since d = ω(1)),
S
n
=
1
n
∑
j∈W
f(Wj,t) ≥ f
 1
n
∑
j∈W
Wj,t
 = f ( t
n
)
=
1
t/n+ 1
≥ 1√
d+ 1.05d
1
4
. (36)
Given the asymptotic condition, for large enough n,
|k|
n
= O(e−
√
d) ≤ 0.1d− 14 , t
nd
≤
√
d+ d
1
4
d
= d−
1
2 + d−
3
4 ≤ 0.1d− 14 ,
S − d
n/
√
d
≥ 1
1 + 1.05d−
1
4
− d
3
2
n
≥ 1− 1.1d− 14 .
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Therefore,
((n+ k)d− t)(S − d)
n− d ≥
((n+ k)d− t)(S − d)
n
≥ d
(
1− |k|
n
− t
nd
)
× n√
d
· S − d
n/
√
d
≥ n
√
d×
(
1− 0.1d− 14 − 0.1d− 14
)
×
(
1− 1.1d− 14
)
≥ n
√
d
(
1− 1.3d− 14
)
. (37)
Utilizing Lemma 14, with16 cj , 1Wj,t+1 , T , (n+ k)d and  , d
− 1
4 , we obtain
P
(
R¯[t] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14
∣∣∣ ~Wt) = P(nR¯[t] ≤ n√d(1− 2.3d− 14)∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ P
(
nR¯[t] ≤ (1− )× n
√
d
(
1− 1.3d− 14
)∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ P
(
nR¯[t] ≤ (1− )× ((n+ k)d− t)(S − d)
n− d
∣∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
2 × ((n+ k)d− t)(S − d)
n− d
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
d−
1
2 × n
√
d
(
1− 1.3d− 14
))
≤ exp(−n/8) ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 1 − 1.3d− 14 ≥ 12 for large enough d. Since the
above result holds for any realization of ~Wt, the claim follows.
Proof of (35): Fix t = n(
√
d− 5d 14 ). Define A ,
{
~Wt
∣∣∣ 1n∑j∈W 1Wj,t+1 ≤ nt + d2n + d− 34 } ⊂ N|W|.
Applying Lemma 8 with ∆, d− 34 , we obtain
P
(
~Wt /∈ A
)
= P
(
S
n
>
n
t
+
d2
n
+ d−
3
4
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−n∆
2
8d
)
= 2 exp
(
−1
8
nd−
5
2
)
.
Regarding the last term, observe that for large enough d, we have
2 exp
(
−1
8
nd−
5
2
)
≤ 1
2
exp
(−nd−4) .
For any ~Wt ∈ A, we have for large enough n,
S
n
≤ n
t
+
d2
n
+ d−
3
4 =
1√
d− 5d 14
+
d2
n
+ d−
3
4 =
1√
d
(
1
1− 5d− 14
+
d
5
2
n
+ d−
1
4
)
≤ 1√
d
(
1 + 6.1d−
1
4
)
,
Furthermore, given the asymptotic conditions,
((n+ k)d− t)S
n− d ≤
(n+ k)dS
n− d
16In Lemma 14, we assume that cj ’s are some deterministic constants whereas we set cj , 1Wj,t+1 here. This is fine
because the results of Lemma 14 are stated in terms of conditional probability given ~Wt.
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≤ n+ |k|
n
· n
n− d · dS
≤ n+ |k|
n
· n
n− d · n
√
d
(
1 + 6.1d−
1
4
)
=
(
1 +
|k|
n
)
· 1
1− d/n · n
√
d
(
1 + 6.1d−
1
4
)
≤
(
1 + 0.1d−
1
4
)
·
(
1 + 0.1d−
1
4
)
· n
√
d
(
1 + 6.1d−
1
4
)
≤ n
√
d
(
1 + 6.4d−
1
4
)
,
where we used the fact that |k|n = O(e
−√d) ≤ 0.1d− 14 and dn ≤ 0.1d−
1
4 for large enough n. We
further utilize Lemma 14: By taking cj , 1Wj,t+1 , T , (n+ k)d and  , d
− 1
4 , we obtain
P
(
R¯[t] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
∣∣∣ ~Wt) = P(nR¯[t] ≥ n√d(1 + 7.5d− 14)∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ P
(
nR¯[t] ≥ (1 + )× n
√
d
(
1 + 6.4d−
1
4
)∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ P
(
nR¯[t] ≥ (1 + )× ((n+ k)d− t)S
n− d
∣∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
2 × ((n+ k)d− t)S
n
)
.
for any ~Wt ∈ A. Also note that, from (37), for large enough n,
((n+ k)d− t)S
n
≥
((
1− |k|
n
)
d− t
n
)
S ≥
((
1− 0.1d− 14
)
d−
√
d+ 5d
1
4
)
S ,
where we used the fact that |k|n = O(e
−√d) ≤ 0.1d− 14 . Because
(
1− 0.1d− 14
)
d−√d+5d 14 ≥ d−1.3d 34
for large enough n, and that S ≥ nt/n+1 as derived in (36), we have
((n+ k)d− t)S
n
≥
(
d− 1.3d 34
) n
t/n+ 1
≥
(
d− 1.3d 34
) n√
d
≥ n
√
d
(
1− 1.3d− 14
)
,
and therefore,
exp
(
−1
4
2 × ((n+ k)d− t)S
n
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
d−
1
2 × n
√
d
(
1− 1.3d− 14
))
≤ exp (−n/8) .
Combining all results, we obtain the desired result: for large enough n,
P
(
R¯[t] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
)
≤ P
(
R¯[t] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
∣∣∣ ~Wt ∈ A) · P( ~Wt ∈ A)+ P( ~Wt /∈ A)
≤ exp (−n/8) + 1
2
exp
(−nd−4)
≤ exp (−nd−4) ,
where the last inequality follows from that n8 ≥ nd4 + log 2 for large enough n and d.
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B.3.2 Concentration of women’s average rank RWOMEN
The following lemma states that conditioned on ( ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d), RWOMEN(MOSM) is concentrated
around R¯[τ ].
Lemma 16. For any given n, k and d and ( ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d) which arises with positive probability,
we have E[RWOMEN(MOSM)| ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d] = 1 + R¯[τ ]. Furthermore, for any  > 0 we have
P
(
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≥ 1 + (1 + )R¯[τ ]
∣∣ ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d) ≤ exp
(
− 2
2n2R¯[τ ]2∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d
)
, (38)
P
(
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≤ 1 + (1− )R¯[τ ]
∣∣ ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d) ≤ exp
(
− 2
2n2R¯[τ ]2∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d
)
. (39)
Proof. Within this proof, we assume that τ , ~Wτ = (Wj,τ )j∈W , and ~W(n+k)d =
(
Wj,(n+k)d
)
j∈W are
revealed (and hence so is R¯[τ ]). In what follows, P(·) and E[·] denote the associated conditional
probability and the conditional expectation, respectively.
For brevity, let wj ,Wj,τ , w′j ,Wj,(n+k)d−Wj,τ , and Rj , Rankj(MOSM)| ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d. Note
that a woman j receives wj proposals until time τ and receives w
′
j proposals after time τ (the total
number of proposals wj + w
′
j = Wj,(n+k)d equals to her degree). Under MOSM, each woman j
is matched to her most preferred one among the first wj proposals, and the rank of her matched
partner under MOSM, Rj , can be determined by the number of men among the remaining (at time
τ) w′j men on her list that she prefers to her matched partner.
More specifically, fix j and let Zjt be the indicator that the woman j prefers her t
th proposal to
all of her first wj proposals for t ∈ {wj + 1, . . . , wj +w′j}. Then, the rank Rj can be represented as
Rj = 1 +
wj+w
′
j∑
t=wj+1
I
(
woman j prefers her tth proposal to all of her first wj proposals
)
= 1 +
wj+w
′
j∑
t=wj+1
Zjt .
Note that (Zjt )
wj+w
′
j
t=wj+1
has the same distribution as (I{U jt > Vj})
wj+w
′
j
t=wj+1
, where (U jt )
wj+w
′
j
t=wj+1
are i.i.d.
Uniform[0, 1] random variables, Vj is the largest order statistic of wj i.i.d. Uniform[0, 1] random
variables, and Vj is independent of U
j
t ’s. Therefore,
E [Rj ] = 1 + w′j · E[Zjwj+1] = 1 + w′j · P(U
j
wj+1
> Vj) = 1 +
w′j
wj + 1
,
and
E[RWOMEN(MOSM)| ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d] =
1
n
∑
j∈W
E[Rj ] = 1 + R¯[τ ] ,
which proves the first claim in Lemma 16.
Note that (Rj)j∈W are i.i.d. and that Rj ∈ [0, w′j ]. Applying Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
P
(
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≥ 1 + (1 + )R¯[τ ]
∣∣ ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d) = P( 1nRj ≥ 1 + (1 + )E[R¯[τ ]]
)
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≤ exp
(
− 2
2n2R¯[τ ]2∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d
)
.
Similarly, we can show that
P
(
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≤ 1 + (1− )R¯[τ ]
∣∣ ~Wτ , ~W(n+k)d) ≤ exp
(
− 2
2n2R¯[τ ]2∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d
)
.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We obtain a high probability lower bound on RWOMEN by combining the
results of Proposition 1, and Lemmas 15 and 16. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 15 and by the fact
that R¯[t] is decreasing on each sample path,
P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14
)
≤ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14 , τ < n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )
)
+ P
(
τ ≥ n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )
)
≤ P
(
R¯[n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14 , τ < n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )
)
+ P
(
τ ≥ n(
√
d+ d
1
4 )
)
≤ exp
(
−n
8
)
+O(exp(−√n)) = O(exp(−√n)) . (40)
We also need a high probability upper bound on
∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d. SinceWj,(n+k)d ∼ Binomial((n+
k)d, 1n), we have for large enough n,
E
[
W 2j,(n+k)d
]
= E2
[
Wj,(n+k)d
]
+ Var
[
Wj,(n+k)d
]
= (n+ k)2d2
1
n2
(
1 + (1− 1
n
)2
)
≤ 2d2 .
Denote µ , E[W1,(n+k)d] = (n+k)dn . Looking up the table of the central moments of Binomial
distribution, we have
E[(W1,(n+k)d − µ)4] = (n+ k)d
1
n
(
1− 1
n
)(
1 + (3(n+ k)d− 6) 1
n
(
1− 1
n
))
.
Using the fact that k = o(n), d = o(n) and d = ω(1), we have for large enough n,
E[(W1,(n+k)d − µ)4] ≤ 2d
(
1 + 3(n+ k)d
1
n
)
≤ 2d · 4d = 8d2 .
Therefore, for large enough n,
Var[W 21,(n+k)d] ≤ E[W 41,(n+k)d]
= E[(µ+ (W1,(n+k)d − µ))4]
≤ 8µ4 + 8E[(W1,(n+k)d − µ)4]
= 8
(n+ k)4d4
n4
+ 64d2
≤ 10d4 .
In the proof of Lemma 4, we have shown that W1,(n+k)d, . . . ,Wn,(n+k)d are NA. By Lemma 3–(iii),
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W 21,(n+k)d, . . . ,W
2
n,(n+k)d are NA, hence we have for large enough n,
Var
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d
 ≤ nVar [W 21,(n+k)d] ≤ 10nd4 .
Applying Chebyshev’s inequality, we have for large enough n,
P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2
 ≤ P
∑
j∈W
(W 2j,(n+k)d − E[W 2j,(n+k)d]) ≥ 2nd2

= P
∑
j∈W
(W 2j,(n+k)d − E[W 2j,(n+k)d]) ≥
2
√
n√
10
√
10nd4

≤ P
∑
j∈W
(W 2j,(n+k)d − E[W 2j,(n+k)d]) ≥
2
√
n√
10
√√√√√Var
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d


≤ 5
2n
≤ 3
n
. (41)
Given that R¯[τ ] >
√
d−2.3d 14 , by plugging  , 0.5d− 14 in (39) of Lemma 16, we obtain for large
enough n,
1 + (1− )R¯[τ ] ≥ 1 + (1− 0.5d− 14 ) ·
√
d(1− 2.3d− 14 ) ≥
√
d(1− 3d− 14 ) =
√
d− 3d 14 . (42)
Therefore,
P
(
RWOMEN ≤
√
d− 3d 14
)
≤ P
RWOMEN ≤ √d− 3d 14 ∣∣∣ R¯[τ ] > √d− 2.3d 14 ,∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14
)
+ P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2

(a)
≤ P
RWOMEN ≤ 1 + (1− )R¯[τ ]∣∣ R¯[τ ] > √d− 2.3d 14 ,∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+O(exp(−√n)) + 3
n
(b)
≤ E
[
exp
(
−
1
2d
− 1
2n2R¯[τ ]2
4nd2
)∣∣∣∣∣ R¯[τ ] > √d− 2.3d 14
]
+
4
n
≤ exp
(
−1
8
d−
5
2n · d(1− 2.3d− 14 )2
)
+
4
n
≤ exp
(
−nd
− 3
2
16
)
+
4
n
≤ 5
n
.
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Here inequality (a) follows from (42), (40), and (41); inequality (b) follows from Lemma 16.
Proof of Proposition 6. We obtain a high probability lower bound on RWOMEN by combining the
results of Proposition 4, and Lemma 15 and 16. By Proposition 4 and Lemma 15,
P
(
R¯[τ ] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
)
≤ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4 , τ > n(
√
d− 5d 14 )
)
+ P
(
τ ≤ n(
√
d− 5d 14 )
)
≤ P
(
R¯[n(
√
d− 5d 14 )] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4 , τ > n(
√
d− 5d 14 )
)
+ P
(
τ ≤ n(
√
d− 5d 14 )
)
≤ exp
(
− n
d4
)
+O(exp(−d 14 ))
≤ O(exp(−d 14 )) .
Given that R¯[τ ] <
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4 , by plugging  , 0.1d− 14 in (38) of Lemma 16, we obtain
1 + (1 + )R¯[τ ] ≤ 1 + (1 + 0.1d− 14 ) ·
√
d(1 + 7.5d−
1
4 ) ≤
√
d(1 + 8d−
1
4 ) =
√
d+ 8d
1
4 ,
for large enough n. Recall that we have shown in the proof of Proposition 5 that
P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2
 ≤ 3
n
.
Therefore, similar to the proof of Proposition 5, we have
P
(
RWOMEN ≥
√
d+ 8d
1
4
)
≤ P
RWOMEN ≥ √d+ 8d 14 ∣∣∣√d− 2.3d 14 < R¯[τ ] < √d+ 7.5d 14 ,∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤
√
d− 2.3d 14
)
+ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≥
√
d+ 7.5d
1
4
)
+ P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2

≤ P
RWOMEN ≥ 1 + (1 + )R¯[τ ]∣∣√d− 2.3d 14 < R¯[τ ] < √d+ 7.5d 14 ,∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+O(exp(−d 14 ))
≤ E
exp(− 22n2R¯[τ ]2∑
j∈WW
2
j,(n+k)d
)∣∣∣∣∣√d− 2.3d 14 < R¯[τ ] < √d+ 7.5d 14 ,∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+O(exp(−d 14 ))
≤ exp
(
− 1
200
d−
5
2n · d(1− 2.3d− 14 )2
)
+O(exp(−d 14 ))
≤ exp
(
−nd
− 3
2
300
)
+O(exp(−d 14 )) = O(exp(−d 14 )) .
34
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 immediately follows from Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
C Proof for Large Sized d: the Case of d = ω(log2 n), d = o(n)
In this section, we consider the case such that d = ω(log2 n) and d = o(n). We will prove a
quantitative version of Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 (Quantitative version of Theorem 2). Consider a sequence of random matching markets
indexed by n, with n + k men and n women (k = k(n) is negative), and the men’s degrees are
d = d(n). If |k| = o(n), d = ω(log2 n) and d = o(n), we have the following results.
1. Men’s average rank of wives. With probability 1− exp(−√log n), we have
RMEN(MOSM) ≤
(
1 + 2
|k|
n
+ 2
1√
log n
)
log n .
2. Women’s average rank of husbands. With probability 1−O(exp(−√log n)), we have
RWOMEN(MOSM) ≥
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
3√
log n
+
d
n/ log n
))
d
log n
.
Proof of Theorem 4. Proof of Theorem 4 part 1. Recall that τ is the the total number of
proposals that are made until the end of MPDA, i.e., the time at which the men-optimal stable
matching (MOSM) is found. We introduce an extended process (which is different from the one
defined in Appendix A.5) as a natural continuation of the MPDA procedure that continues to
evolve even after the MOSM is found (i.e., the extended process continues for t > τ). To define
the extended process, we start by defining an extended market, which has the same n women and
n+ k men, but each man has a complete preference list, i.e. each man ranks all n women. We call
the first d women of a man’s preference list his “real” preferences and the last n − d women his
“fake” preferences. The distribution of preferences in the extended market is again as described
in Section 2. We then define the extended process as tracking the progress of Algorithm 1 on the
extended market: the n + k men enter first in Algorithm 1 with only their real preferences, as
before. After time τ , we let the men see their fake preferences and continue Algorithm 1 until the
MOSM with full preferences is found. We denote by τ ′ the total number of proposals to find the
MOSM with full preferences. It is easy to see that τ is stochastically dominated by τ ′.
Note that τ ′ is the total number of proposals needed to find the MOSM in a completely-
connected market, which has been studied in previous works including Ashlagi et al. (2015), Pittel
(2019b). It is well-known that τ ′ is stochastically dominated by the number of draws in a coupon
collector’s problem, in which one coupon is chosen out of n coupons uniformly at random at
a time and it runs until n distinct coupons are collected. Let X be the number of draws in
the coupon collector’s problem. A widely used tail bound of X is the following: for β > 1,
P(X ≥ βn log n) ≤ n−β+1. By taking β = 1 + 1√
logn
, we have
P
(
X ≥ n log n+ n
√
log n
)
≤ n− 1√logn = e−
√
logn = o(1) .
Hence with probability 1 − e−
√
logn, we have τ ≤ n(log n + √log n). Because X stochastically
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dominates τ , we have, with probability 1− e−
√
logn,
RMEN(MOSM) ≤ n
n+ k
(log n+
√
log n) + 1 .
Because k = o(n) and k < 0, for large enough n we have nn+k ≤ 1 + 2|k|n , |k|n < 13 , 1 ≤ 13
√
log n,
hence
n
n+ k
(log n+
√
log n) + 1
≤
(
1 + 2
|k|
n
)
log n+ (1 +
2
3
)
√
log n+
1
3
√
log n
=
(
1 + 2
|k|
n
+ 2
1√
log n
)
log n .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4 part 2.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5. Recall that the proof of Proposition 5 relies on
Proposition 1, Lemma 15, and Lemma 16. In the following, we first establish the counterparts of
these results in dense markets.
Counterpart of Proposition 1 in dense markets. We have shown in the proof of Theorem 4(1)
that with probability 1− exp(−√log n), we have
τ ≤ n
(
log n+
√
log n
)
. (43)
Counterpart of Lemma 15 in dense markets. Fix t = n
(
log n+
√
log n
)
. Given the asymptotic
condition, we have for large enough n,
t
nd
=
log n+
√
log n
d
≤ 0.1(log n)−1 .
By examining the proof of Lemma 14, we can see that we have proved the following result (see the
statement of Lemma 14 for the definition of the notations), which is stronger than than (32):
P
Yt,T ≤ (1− )T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ~Wt
 ≤ exp
−1
4
2 × T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
 (44)
Let cj , 1Wj,t+1 where W1,t ≥ W2,t ≥ · · · ≥ Wn,T , and T , (n + k)d. Due to the convexity of
f(x) , 1x+1 , we have for large enough n,
1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj =
1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
f(Wj,t) ≥ f
 1
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
Wj,t
 ≥ f ( t
n− d
)
=
1
t/(n− d) + 1 ≥
1
log n
(
1 + 1.05 1√
logn
+ 1.05 dn
) . (45)
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Therefore, for large enough n,
T − t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj ≥ n(n+ k)d− t
n
1
log n
(
1 + 1.05 1√
logn
+ 1.05 dn
)
≥ nd
(
1− |k|
n
− t
nd
)
1
log n
(
1 + 1.05 1√
logn
+ 1.05 dn
)
≥ nd
(
1− |k|
n
− 0.1
log n
)
1
log n
(
1− 1.05 1√
log n
− 1.05d
n
)
≥ nd
log n
(
1− 1.1 |k|
n
− 1.1 1√
log n
− 1.1d
n
)
. (46)
Utilizing Lemma 14 (which does not use assumptions on d) with  , 1√
logn
, we obtain
P
(
R¯[t] ≤ d
log n
(
1−
(
1.1
|k|
n
+
2.1√
log n
+ 1.1
d
n
))∣∣∣∣ ~Wt)
= P
(
nR¯[t] ≤ nd
log n
(
1−
(
1.1
|k|
n
+
2.1√
log n
+ 1.1
d
n
))∣∣∣∣ ~Wt)
≤ P
(
nR¯[t] ≤ (1− )× nd
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
1√
log n
+
d
n
))∣∣∣∣ ~Wt)
(a)
≤ P
nR¯[t] ≤ (1− )× (n+ k)d− t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ~Wt

(b)
≤ exp
−1
4
2 × (n+ k)d− t
n− d
n−d∑
j=1
cj

(c)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
1
log n
× nd
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
1√
log n
+
d
n
)))
≤ exp(−n/8) .
Here inequalities (a) and (c) follow from (46), inequality (b) follows from Lemma 14, and the last
inequality follows from the fact that d = ω(log2 n). Since the above result holds for any realization
of ~Wt, we have
P
(
R¯
[
n(log n+
√
log n)
]
≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
)))
≤ exp
(
−n
8
)
. (47)
Counterpart of Lemma 16 in dense markets. Note that the proof of Lemma 16 does not make
any assumption on d, hence (39) still holds.
Proof of Theorem 4 part 2. Using (43) and (47), and the fact that R¯[t] is decreasing on each
sample path,
P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
)))
≤ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
))
, τ < n(log n+
√
log n)
)
+ P
(
τ ≥ n(log n+
√
log n)
)
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≤ P
(
R¯
[
n(log n+
√
log n)
]
≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
)))
+ P
(
τ ≥ n(log n+
√
log n)
)
(a)
≤ exp
(
−n
8
)
+O(exp(−
√
log n)) = O(exp(−
√
log n)) . (48)
Here inequality (a) follows from (47). Recall inequality (41): for large enough n
P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2
 ≤ 3
n
.
In the derivation of the above inequality, we only used the fact that d = ω(1), d = o(n) and k = o(n),
which also holds in dense markets.
Given that R¯[τ ] > dlogn
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n +
2√
logn
+ dn
))
, by plugging  , 0.5 1√
logn
in (39) of Lemma
16, we obtain for large enough n,
1 + (1− )R¯[τ ] ≥ 1 +
(
1− 0.5 1√
log n
)
d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
))
≥ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
3√
log n
+
d
n
))
. (49)
Therefore,
P
(
RWOMEN ≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
3√
log n
+
d
n
)))
≤ P
(
RWOMEN ≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
3√
log n
+
d
n
))∣∣∣∣
R¯[τ ] >
d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
))
,
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2

+ P
(
R¯[τ ] ≤ d
log n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
)))
+ P
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d ≥ 4nd2

(a)
≤ P
(
RWOMEN ≤ 1 + (1− )R¯[τ ]
∣∣∣∣R¯[τ ] > dlog n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
))
,
∑
j∈W
W 2j,(n+k)d < 4nd
2
+O(exp(−√log n)) + 3
n
(b)
≤ E
[
exp
(
−
1
2 lognn
2R¯[τ ]2
4nd2
)∣∣∣∣∣ R¯[τ ] > dlog n
(
1− 1.1
( |k|
n
+
2√
log n
+
d
n
))]
+O(exp(−
√
log n))
≤ exp
(
−1
8
n
d2 log n
· d
2
2 log2 n
)
+O(exp(−
√
log n))
≤ exp
(
−n(log n)
−3
16
)
+O(exp(−
√
log n))
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≤ O(exp(−
√
log n)) .
Here inequality (a) follows from (49), (48), and (41); inequality (b) follows from Lemma 16. This
concludes the proof.
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